Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress

Rothenberg, Lawrence S.; Sanders, Mitchell S.

doi:10.2307/2669313

Cited by 163 publications

(151 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Perhaps even more troubling from a normative perspective is the possibility that Congress members may alter their legislative behavior in their final term or session to become friendlier to the business, industry, or concern that they will lobby for (Rothenberg and Sanders 2000;Kousser, Lewis and Masket 2007). Voting records, bill introduction patterns, and committee activity are all areas which future employers may be interested in exploiting prior to when the member leaves office.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who walks through the revolving door? Examining the lobbying activity of former members of Congress

2016

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Abstract:Government watchdog groups and the government itself have shown concern about the "revolving door" of employees moving from Congress to private lobbying organizations. As of yet, the academic literature analyzing who becomes a revolving door lobbyist is small but growing. We contribute to this literature by examining which former members of Congress become lobbyists. We construct a dataset of all members of Congress who left the institution between 1976 and 2012, identifying those who go on to register as lobbyists. We observe several trends. Among these: there is not a significant difference in the rates at which former House members and senators become lobbyists; institutional standing (in the form of party leadership and other such positions) has a profound effect on which former House members become lobbyists, but less so among former senators; and there is some evidence that Republican former senators are more likely to become lobbyists than Democratic former senators, but this party difference is virtually absent among former House members.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who walks through the revolving door? Examining the lobbying activity of former members of Congress

2016

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“…Not much (Bender and Lott 1996;Lott 1987;Lott and Davis 1992;Poole and Romer 1993;Rothenberg and Sanders 2000). The most generous estimates for the magnitude of the retirement effect are around one to three percent of roll call votes, from Rothenberg and Sanders (2000). If legislators facing electoral constraints make so 15 Buchler: Redistricting Reform Will Not Solve California's Budget Crisis few concessions to their constituents, then changing the electoral pressure they face will do very little to reduce polarization.…”

Section: Candidates Have Policy Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…So, how much do retiring legislators change their voting patterns? Not much (Bender and Lott 1996;Lott 1987;Lott and Davis 1992;Poole and Romer 1993;Rothenberg and Sanders 2000). The most generous estimates for the magnitude of the retirement effect are around one to three percent of roll call votes, from Rothenberg and Sanders (2000).…”

Section: Candidates Have Policy Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Redistricting Reform Will Not Solve California's Budget Crisis

Buchler¹

2009

CJPP

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Jarvis (2009) argues that ideological polarization in California's state legislature creates unique problems for the state because of the interaction between polarization and the requirement that the budget pass with a two-thirds supermajority. Thus, Jarvis argues that California should adopt a system of redistricting that produces more competitive elections in order to reduce polarization. However, that is the wrong solution. Increasing the number of competitive districts would have a minimal effect on polarization because polarization has other causes. Instead, the solution is to abandon the two-thirds budget requirement since polarization cannot be solved through redistricting, and increasing the number of competitive districts simply reduces representation. In several previous papers (Buchler 2005(Buchler , 2007a(Buchler , 2007b, I argued that promoting competitive elections makes elected officials less representative of their constituents' preferences and interests. Jarvis (2009) acknowledges that minimizing the number of competitive elections promotes representation, but argues that there are more important concerns than representation in California. In order for a budget to be approved by the state legislature, each chamber must pass the budget with a two-thirds supermajority rather than a simple majority. When two ideologically polarized parties must somehow cobble together a two-thirds supermajority in order to pass a budget, problems inevitably ensue. Hence, Jarvis argues that California should sacrifice representation in order to reduce polarization because the interaction between an ideologically polarized legislature, a two-thirds supermajority requirement, and several other factors causes too many problems. KEYWORDS: competition, redistricting, polarization, budget Journal ofIn order to reduce polarization, Jarvis (2009) argues that California should adopt a system of redistricting that creates more competitive districts. The premise of that argument is a common one. The post-2000 census round of redistricting in California was a classic example of a bipartisan gerrymander. In a bipartisan gerrymander, voters of each party are packed into relatively homogenous districts, thus guaranteeing each party a fixed number of safe seats, and eliminating any seats that might potentially be competitive in the general election. In the 2000 presidential election, 15 of California's 52 U.S. House districts had Bush and Gore separated by less than 10 points in the two-party vote. In the 2004 presidential election, only five of California's 53 House districts had Bush and Kerry separated by less than 10 points. Patterns were similar in both the Assembly and state Senate districts. Competitive districts were eliminated, and voters were packed into relatively homogenous districts that would be safe for either the Democrats or Republicans.Conventional wisdom holds that such bipartisan gerrymanders are responsible for ideological polarization in the legislature. After all, if legislators have no need to worry...

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“…In casting roll call votes, legislators are able to appease their constituents by reflecting the ideological dispositions of constituencies (Mayhew 1974;Rothenberg and Sanders 2000). The senator's faithful ideological positions which are consistent with constituent preferences are considered good representation in the eyes of constituents.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The senator's faithful ideological positions which are consistent with constituent preferences are considered good representation in the eyes of constituents. Furthermore, the electoral connection thesis asserts that elections serve to constrain the senator's activities in Washington (Herrick, Moore, and Hibbing 1994;Rothenberg and Sanders 2000;Carson and Engstrom 2005). The incumbent who fails to represent constituent interests and preferences is presumed to gain less electoral support in the next election.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Senator�s Strategic Use of Time in Representation

Choi¹

2017

JPPG

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Abstract:Remaining time to reelection serves as a constraint and an opportunity for senators to adapt constituency preferences for their legislative decision making. The relatively long length of terms may allow senators to change their ideological positions over the course of their terms. Given long terms of six-years, senators may be able to seek first to vote in favor of party discipline and personal policy motivation and then to take a strategy to keep step with constituency preferences as their reelections approach. This study finds that the long length of the term serves as an opportunity for senators to seek to achieve their preferred policy and maximize the chances of reelection.

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Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress

Cited by 163 publications

References 13 publications

Who walks through the revolving door? Examining the lobbying activity of former members of Congress

Who walks through the revolving door? Examining the lobbying activity of former members of Congress

Redistricting Reform Will Not Solve California's Budget Crisis

The Senator�s Strategic Use of Time in Representation

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