‘'Sex Changes'? Paradigm Shifts in ‘Sex’ and ‘Gender’ following the Gender Recognition Act?’

Abstract

Gender transformations are normatively understood as somatic, based on surgical reassignment, where the sexed body is aligned with the gender identity of the individual through genital surgery – hence the common lexicon ‘sex change surgery’. We suggest that the UK Gender Recognition Act 2004 challenges what constitutes a ‘sex change’ through the Act's definitions and also the conditions within which legal ‘recognition’ is permitted. The sex/gender distinction, (where sex normatively refers to the sexed body, and gender, to social identity) is demobilised both literally and legally. This paper discusses the history of medico-socio-legal definitions of sex have been developed through decision making processes when courts have been faced with people with gender variance and, in particular, the implications of the Gender Recognition Act for our contemporary legal understanding of sex. We ask, and attempt to answer, has ‘sex’ changed?

Sex and gender equality law and policy: a response to Murray, Hunter Blackburn and Mackenzie

“…Instead, Murray et al cite Stock (2018) as their source here, though no such reference appears in the bibliography. The 2019 Stock reference that is cited is not a peer reviewed source but there are countless peer reviewed publications that discuss these issues (see, diversely, for example, Koyama (2003), Whittle and Turner (2007), Bettcher (2009), Serano (2016), Jenkins 2018). The absence of peer-reviewed sources also undermines the authority of empirical claims such as, for example, '[t]he so-called "gender pay gap" is largely a "motherhood penalty", while sexual violence and domestic abuse can be related to the lower status ascribed to the female class' (p265, where the referenced source is a TUC document).…”

“…In any case, since then the European Court of Justice in Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 18 held that UK law was in violation of Articles 8 and 12 of the ECHR in not allowing trans people to marry in their 'post-operative' sex. This in turn led to the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (hereafter GRA), which allowed trans people to change the sex marker on their birth certificates, and to get married and be legally recognised in their 'acquired' gender (section 1(2)), as discussed below (see also Whittle and Turner 2007).…”

Genderqueer(ing): ‘On this side of the world against which it protests’

“…The GRA 2004 has been affected by and affects many transsexual, transgender and genderqueer people (Davy, 2011;Whittle and Turner, 2007). Charles was unsure if he wanted to have body modification surgery and hormones, and Gregory was unable to, but both still wanted to be legally recognized as men.…”

Έμφυλη Κατηγοριοποίηση, Δικαστική Ερμηνεία Και Επαναπροσδιορισμός Φύλου Στο Ελληνικό Νομικό Πλαίσιο

“…Με αυτό τον τρόπο το φύλο επιστρέφει στις αίθουσες των δικαστηρίων συνοδεία πλήθους ειδικών υγείας και με το καινούριο θεωρητικό εργαλείο της διάκρισης μεταξύ βιολογικού και κοινωνικού φύλου. Η διάκριση αυτή χρησιμοποιήθηκε αρχικά την δεκαετία του '50 στον ιατρικό λόγο για τα θεωρούμενα ως «ερμαφρόδιτα» άτομα αλλά στην συνέχεια την δεκαετία του '60 αποτέλεσε το λογοθετικό όχημα για την κατανόηση της τρανς εμπειρίας και την ανάδυση της τρανς ταυτότητας (Whittle & Turner 2007: 2.1). Μέχρι σήμερα, και παρά της κριτικές που έχει δεχτεί η διάκριση αυτή από πολλές/ους σύγχρονες/ους θεωρητικούς των κοινωνικών επιστημών (Fausto-Sterling 1992, West & Zimmerman 1991, ο λόγος για την διακριτότητα βιολογικού και κοινωνικού φύλου αποτελεί μεγάλο κομμάτι των λόγων, κυρίαρχων και μη, γύρω από την τρανς υποκειμενικότητα.…”