And since you know you cannot see yourself, so well as by reflection, I, your glass, will modestly discover to yourself, that of yourself which you yet know not of.(W. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act I, scene ii, lines 69-72)
Autonomy QualifiedHow do the relationships I entertain with others determine my autonomy? According to the traditional account of autonomy that can be traced back to Kant (Schneewind 1998), such a question would not be well formulated. In that view, autonomy should be conceived as a freedom of self-rule. The extent to which an agent cultivates and improves her autonomy determines the kind of relationships she will be able to entertain with others -and not vice versa. However, in the last decades, feminist philosophers (e.g. Friedman 2003; Oshana 2006) have charged the traditional account of autonomy as being too individualistic. They contend that autonomy cannot be understood without taking into serious consideration how social relationships and social bonds affect an agent's autonomy. The notion of 'relational autonomy' has been used as an 'umbrella term' to investigate the social nature of autonomy (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000: 3-33). From this relational point of view, our relationships with others are necessary conditions for our autonomy. In today's debate, autonomy can be understood as relational in two senses. On the one hand, 'causal' approaches maintain that the agent's autonomy is causally affected by her relationships and by the socio-cultural environment in which she operates. On the other hand, constitutive approaches hold that social relationships and social embeddedness are necessary conditions of what autonomy is and of how it should be understood. 1 In this chapter, I contend that Spinoza's moral philosophy not only develops an account of (constitutive) relational autonomy, 2 but it also introduces a further distinction between a quantitative dimension of autonomy (i.e. the capacity of an agent to be more or less autonomous) and a qualitative dimension