Sexual Misconduct on a Scale: Gravity, Coercion, and Consent

Dougherty, Tom

doi:10.1086/711211

Cited by 32 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Kant's claim was that when we are in danger of using someone as a thing, we can only solve the problem by putting ourselves into a relation with them where we treat one another as end-setting beings, by promising to share our ends with one another. I will show how Kant's conception of sharing ends is importantly different from standard ideas of consent, and argue that an account of setting and sharing sexual ends can address the sorts of sexual wrongs that, as Tom Dougherty has argued, consent can ameliorate but not eliminate [14].…”

Section: Doing Philosophy In Bedmentioning

confidence: 96%

Beyond Consent: On Setting and Sharing Sexual Ends

Pascoe

2023

Philosophies

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This paper formulates a response to standard accounts of Kantian sexual morality, by first clarifying why sex should be understood as a case of using a person as a thing, rather than merely as a means. The author argues that Kant’s remedy to this problem is not sexual consent, but a model of setting and sharing sexual ends. Kant’s account of sexual morality, read in this way, is a critical framework for contemporary moves to think beyond consent, and to grapple with concerns about sexual violation and “bad sex” that have gained uptake in the wake of the MeToo movement. The author defends an account of sex as a process of setting and sharing sexual ends in a Kantian key, which provides us with resources for thinking about the robust ongoing project of making our sexual selves in nonideal conditions, as well as for identifying the wrongs of both “bad” sex and sexual harassment. In doing so, they offer a critical middle ground between contemporary accounts of sexual morality that center questions of individual agency or autonomy, and those that foreground the intersubjective nature of sex.

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Section: Doing Philosophy In Bedmentioning

confidence: 96%

Beyond Consent: On Setting and Sharing Sexual Ends

Pascoe

2023

Philosophies

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“…in how wrongful it is). While particularly grave misconduct results from the use of major coercion to obtain consent, there is also less grave misconduct that results from consent being undermined in less egregious ways (Dougherty 2021a). As some people may like to put the idea: rather than there being a sharp binary of consensual and non-consensual sex, it is more illuminating to think of sexual encounters as more or less consensual.…”

Section: Section 1 Consent's Justificatory Force and Gravitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Social constraints on sexual consent

Dougherty

2022

Politics, Philosophy & Economics

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Sometimes, people consent to sex because they face social constraints. For example, someone may agree to sex because they believe that it would be rude to refuse. I defend a consent-centric analysis of these encounters. This analysis connects constraints from social contexts with constraints imposed by persons e.g. coercion. It results in my endorsing what I call the “Constraint Principle.” According to this principle, someone's consent to a sexual encounter lacks justificatory force if (i) they are consenting because withholding consent has an adverse feature, (ii) they are entitled to withhold consent without it being the case that withholding consent has this adverse feature; and (iii) it is not the case that the consent-giver has sincerely expressed that, out of the options that are available to their sexual partner, they most prefer to go through with the sexual encounter in the circumstances.

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“…Cf. Dougherty (2021). she is "not making the decision ( … ) herself" (Millum, 2014, p. 118) and hence her consent is invalid, no matter who exerted the coercion.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consenting Under Third-Party Coercion

Kiener

2021

J. Moral Philos.

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This paper focuses on consent and third-party coercion, viz. cases in which a person consents to another person performing a certain act because a third party coerced her into doing so. I argue that, in these cases, the validity of consent depends on the behavior of the recipient of consent rather than the third party’s coercion taken separately, and I will specify the conditions under which consent is invalid. My view, which is a novel version of what I call a Recipient-Focus-View, holds that coercion invalidates consent only if consent was ‘obtained by’ coercion, but not if consent was ‘merely motivated by’ coercion. I explain and support my view on the basis that it best reconciles an unnoticed tension between two fundamental principles in the debate on consent (which I call the Coercion Principle and the Permissibility Principle) and that it can deal with cases that undermine other Recipient-Focus-Views.

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Sexual Misconduct on a Scale: Gravity, Coercion, and Consent

Cited by 32 publications

References 13 publications

Beyond Consent: On Setting and Sharing Sexual Ends

Beyond Consent: On Setting and Sharing Sexual Ends

Social constraints on sexual consent

Consenting Under Third-Party Coercion

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