Proceedings of the Twelfth European Conference on Computer Systems 2017
DOI: 10.1145/3064176.3064192
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Sgxbounds

Abstract: Shielded execution based on Intel SGX provides strong security guarantees for legacy applications running on untrusted platforms. However, memory safety attacks such as Heartbleed can render the confidentiality and integrity properties of shielded execution completely ineffective. To prevent these attacks, the state-of-the-art memory-safety approaches can be used in the context of shielded execution.In this work, we first showcase that two prominent softwareand hardware-based defenses, AddressSanitizer and Int… Show more

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Cited by 86 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…In addition to the traditional approaches to ensure that the supervisor is correctly designed, we also need to ensure that it is correctly executed. Specifically, related work investigates the correct execution of the supervisor when executed on potentially unreliable hardware [25], under security attacks [28,5,27] or even protect its integrity despite the existence of CPU design faults [26].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition to the traditional approaches to ensure that the supervisor is correctly designed, we also need to ensure that it is correctly executed. Specifically, related work investigates the correct execution of the supervisor when executed on potentially unreliable hardware [25], under security attacks [28,5,27] or even protect its integrity despite the existence of CPU design faults [26].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…And even a binarycompatible SGX LibOS sometimes demands recompilation so that the legacy source code can be modified to work around the hardware limitatations of SGX or the system call limitations of the LibOS. Futhermore, the recompilation of source code provides the opportunity to integrate SGXspecific, compiler-based hardening techniques [42,45].…”
Section: Library Oses For Intel Sgxmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Horizon2020 funded research projects under SERECA 3 focus on a number of goals to build secure enclaves. These goals include application partitioning [36], trusted architectures for web services [8,33], container architecture [3] and library support for unmodified applications (SGX-LKL 4 ), better integrity [5] and isolation [7], and enclave memory safety [35] in the cloud.…”
Section: Research Directionmentioning
confidence: 99%