Shanghai municipal investment corporation: Extending government power through financialization under state entrepreneurialism

Abstract

Financialized urban governance means that local governments have been increasingly reliant on financial techniques and in some extreme cases, been captured by shareholders’ interests. However, financialized governance mutates with various characteristics of local governance. This paper unpacks financialized urban governance in China based on the operation of Shanghai Municipal Investment Corporation (SMI). The Shanghai municipal government uses SMI as an intermediary to finance urban development. Based on the latest corporatization of SMI, we illustrate an embryonic form of financialized governance in which the Shanghai municipal government relies on financial means especially shareholding to manage and support SMI. In doing so, the municipal government internalizes financial techniques to manage state assets, seek funding, and guide urban development projects. The power of the state is not undermined during the process of financialization. Instead, the Shanghai government extends its power to the financial market to achieve its goals.

The ‘medical city’ and China’s entrepreneurial state: Spatial production under rising consumerism in healthcare

“…The state’s power and control are diffused through the quasi-governmental agencies to the private hospitals. This technique is similar to the findings by Feng et al (2022) on financialised urban governance in Shanghai. The shareholding of the state-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of Shanghai legitimises the state’s power over the Shanghai Municipal Investment Corporation, which manages urban development.…”

“…The first objective is to discuss the privately-developed publicly-operated model (PDPO) through which the state legitimises the private sector. The second objective is to unfold the stakeholding structure in the HIMC, in which the state diffuses its power to the private hospitals through quasi-governmental agencies since stakeholding is an important instrument for the state to manage urban governance (Feng et al, 2022). Responding to the objectives, this research employs a mixed-method study.…”

Building state centrality through state selective financialization: Reconfiguring the land reserve system in China

“…In China, there are compromises at every point in the negotiation (Zheng and Huang, 2018). Although chengtou were prohibited from borrowing against reserved land, they could still conduct land-related projects and enter the financial market as so-called "independent entities" (Feng et al, 2023). The reconfiguration of the land reserve system should be regarded as a central government endeavor to rebuild its authority over land borrowing.…”

The theory and practice of grassroots quasi-administrative division adjustment: Converting farms to ‘Ju’ in Hainan Province

“…3 准行政区划视角下 "居" 的性质界定 及其与正式行政区划的关系 制和国有企业改革 [51][52][53] 以及国营农场转制 [41,54] 的研 究多集中在城市化水平较高的地区， 鲜有研究关注 偏离城市和中心镇的国营农场。因此， 本文能够与 已有的国营农场改革、 单位制转制和国有经济转型 的研究展开对话， 并从农场社区化的角度对已有文 献加以补充和拓展。实际上， 农场与大型国企主导 的矿区 [55] 和城投公司主导的开发区 [56] 有诸多类似之 处， 因此， 本文也有助于重新理解 "国家" 与市场的 概念、 区分国有企业与地方政府的不同功能、 厘清 国家在地方发展中的角色 [57] 。第二， 本文对基层 (准)行政区划设置和优化具有启发意义。中国的行 政区划设置相对区域经济发展往往具有滞后性 [2] 。 造成这一现象的主要原因在于行政区划具有系统 性， 往往牵一发而动全身， 因此， 行政区划调整主要 是地方政府对区域资源争夺和事权下移诉求的体 现和地方与中央关系博弈的结果 [58] 。然而， 基层行 政区划的功能更多是满足居民的公共服务需求， 其 设置具有准行政区划特性， 也能够进行一些灵活的 调整而不会对国家长治久安产生较大的冲击。实 际上， 已有学者提出， 在单位制解体和社区建设中， 应该更多通过群众自治组织和空间治理单元 [28] 等 非正式的行政单位推动基层治理。本文无疑从准 行政区划的角度推动了基层行政区划设置相关问 题的研究。第三， 本文推进了对准行政区划问题的 研究。目前国内准行政区划研究主要关注所谓的 "功能区" [59] ， 很少从行政区划的理论视角探讨相关 问题。然而， 准行政区划不仅是行政区划概念的应…”