Shapley Value-Based Payment Calculation for Energy Exchange between Micro- and Utility Grids

Pilling, Robin; Chang, Soon-Jyh; Luh, Peter B.

doi:10.3390/g8040045

Cited by 15 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Another frequently discussed cooperative solution for the MG situation is the Shapley value [27]. This solution is considered to compensate for energy exchange through fair payments for power transactions between power systems according to a mutually agreeable division of the joint operation costs.…”

Section: B Shapley Value: Concerning Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Profit-Sharing Rule for Networked Microgrids Based on Myerson Value in Cooperative Game

Suh

Yoon

2021

IEEE Access

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Networked microgrids (MGs) have several advantages over individual MGs such as reliability improvement and cost reduction. To promote the mutual connection of individual MGs, a rational and predictable profit-sharing rule is required. This study investigates a rule for the fair distribution of profit in networked MGs according to their contributions that come from connecting between them. Cooperative game theory defines profit-sharing problems such as the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) and Shapley value. However, as the two solution concepts are used assuming that the network is complete, they do not account for the positional contribution of each MG in a given network. We propose a variation of the Shapley value designed for an incomplete network, the Myerson value. We investigate how Myerson value-based profitsharing rule can account for both the role and positional contributions of each MG. Using Korean data, we compare the profit distribution results for the three sharing rules (the NBS, Shapley value, and Myerson value). The result confirms that the proposed rule fairly distributes the profit according to one's contribution, even when MGs are incompletely connected.INDEX TERMS Cooperative game theory, Myerson value, Nash bargaining solution (NBS), network structure, networked microgrids, Shapley value.

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Section: B Shapley Value: Concerning Fairnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Profit-Sharing Rule for Networked Microgrids Based on Myerson Value in Cooperative Game

Suh

Yoon

2021

IEEE Access

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“…The Shapley value is a solution concept in cooperative game theory that fairly and uniquely solves the problem of the distribution of surplus (or joint-cost allocation) among players when considering the worth (or cost) of each coalition [18]. Today, the Shapley value is perhaps the most commonly used method to allocate the costs in cost-sharing games [19] because it is budget-balanced and guarantees equilibrium in any game, regardless of its parameters [20]. We compute the Shapley value (see Appendix AppendixA) using Equation ( 8) as a characteristic function.…”

Section: Shapley Valuementioning

confidence: 99%

On the Guifi.net community network economics

Cerdà-Alabern

Baig²,

Navarro

2020

Computer Networks

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“…In the literature [19][20][21] models are introduced in which the harvested energy at one renewable energy generator or the stored energy at one storage system can be utilized to operate more than one user. To distinct goals exist in another paper [19]: quantify the optimal utilization of RES and evaluating how the volatility of RES influences the optimal exploitation.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The goal is to ensure social welfare and find the cost optimal planning of users with controllable appliances. Regarding another paper [21], Pilling et al developed a model with joint operation of a microgrid and its hosting utility. The case study from the work of [21] proved that systems cost operation can be reduced by minimizing daily operation costs through energy exchange.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Demand Response and Distributed Generation Remuneration Approach Considering Planning and Operation Stages

Silva¹,

Faria²,

Vale

2019

Energies

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The need for new business models to replace existing ones, soon obsolete, is a subject often discussed among researchers in the area. It is essential to find a practical solution that includes the concepts of demand response and distributed generation in the energy markets, these being the future of the electricity grid. It is believed that these resources can bring advantages to the operation of the system, namely increasing technical efficiency. However, one of the problems is the aggregation of small resources as a result of the associated uncertainties. The authors propose a business model with three main phases used in planning: optimal scheduling, aggregation, and remuneration. In this paper, a new phase was added, the classification, with the main purpose of assisting the aggregator of these small resources in operating situations. The focus is on the fair remuneration of participants in the management of the market, in addition to minimizing operating costs. After testing four different remuneration methods, it was proved that the method proposed by the authors obtained better results, proving the viability of the proposed model.

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Shapley Value-Based Payment Calculation for Energy Exchange between Micro- and Utility Grids

Cited by 15 publications

References 20 publications

Profit-Sharing Rule for Networked Microgrids Based on Myerson Value in Cooperative Game

Profit-Sharing Rule for Networked Microgrids Based on Myerson Value in Cooperative Game

On the Guifi.net community network economics

Demand Response and Distributed Generation Remuneration Approach Considering Planning and Operation Stages

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