Share contracting for California Gold

Hallagan, William

doi:10.1016/0014-4983(78)90021-9

Cited by 22 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…On the other hand, there is evidence (Combs and Ketchen, 1999;Dant, 1995;Hallagan, 1978b) for the long-standing practitioner argument (Kroc, 1982;Rosenberg and Bedell, 1969) that capital markets do not support start-ups. For example, small firms in developing countries have a hard time getting financing (Satta, 2007).…”

Section: Extending the Inefficient Resource Market Argumentmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Second, agents must prevent free-riding by principals. For example, an agent who leases gold mining rights and invests in site-specific equipment will avoid fixed rent because the land may be unproductive (Hallagan, 1978a;1978b). And, although franchisees often invest substantial sums, their franchise contracts typically allow franchisors to end relationships quickly (Hadfield, 1990).…”

Section: Extending the Agency/transaction Cost Argumentmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…And, although franchisees often invest substantial sums, their franchise contracts typically allow franchisors to end relationships quickly (Hadfield, 1990). However, share contracts may also protect agents by defining their termination rights, protecting their capital improvements, and providing escape clauses (Hallagan, 1978b;Cheung, 1969;Ho, 1976). Other problems include principals exploiting monopoly power over inputs (Inaba, 1980), withholding relevant information (Brickley, Dark, and Weisbach, 1991;Castrogiovanni, Justis, and Julian, 1993), keeping better resources for themselves (Chaudhuri, Ghosh, and Spell, 2001), or simply abandoning their relationships (Brown, 1969;Luxenberg, 1985).…”

Section: Extending the Agency/transaction Cost Argumentmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Franchising and Other Share Relationships?¹

Pruett

Winter

2011

Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship

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Many entrepreneurs enter long-term relationships such as franchising, an important area of entrepreneurship research. However, franchising is but one version of an underlying organizational form-long-term share relationships-in which both principals and agents receive variable returns. Using two major streams of research that have long remained largely separate from one another-franchising and sharecropping-we build an integrative model of the determinants of share relationships, apply an evolutionary perspective to show how incentives may change, develop explanations for longstanding theoretical conflicts, and generate a fresh set of research propositions.résUMé. Un bon nombre d'entrepreneurs entrent dans des relations d'affaires à long terme tel que le franchisage, un important domaine de la recherche en entrepreneuriat. Par contre, le franchisage n'est qu'une version d'une forme organisationnelle sous-jacente, soit les relations de partage à long terme dans lesquelles les partenaires de cette relation, les franchiseurs et les franchisés, ont des rendements qui varient. c'est à l'aide de deux volets de recherche, le franchisage et le métayage, lesquels sont longtemps demeurés séparés, que les auteurs ont développé un modèle d'intégration des déterminants des relations de partage, appliqué une perspective évolutionnaire pour montrer la façon dont les motivations peuvent évoluer, élaboré des explications quant à des conflits théoriques de longue date, et élaboré de nouvelles hypothèses de recherche.

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Section: Extending the Inefficient Resource Market Argumentmentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Extending the Agency/transaction Cost Argumentmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Extending the Agency/transaction Cost Argumentmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Franchising and Other Share Relationships?¹

Pruett

Winter

2011

Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship

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“…Case studies on vertical integration, contracting, and contracting design include: Acheson (1985), Adler, Scherer, Barton, and Katerberg (1998), Lueck (1992, 1998), Alston, Datta, and Nugent (1984), Alston and Higgs (1982), Argyres (1996), Bercovitz (1999), Bowen and Jones (1986), Brickley (1999), Buttrick (1952), Chandler (1977), Cheung (1973), Masten (1988, 1991), Crocker and Reynolds (1993), Dahl and Matson (1998), Dyer (1996), Gallick (1984), Galunic and Anderson (2000), Globerman and Schwindt (1986), Goldberg and Erickson (1987), Hallagan (1978aHallagan ( , 1978b, Heide, Dutta, and Bergen (1998), Hennart (1988), Hubbard (2001), Hubbard and Weiner (1986), Jacobides (2005), Jones and Pustay (1988), Joskow (1987Joskow ( , 1990, Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994), Klein et al (1978), Klein (1989), Lafontaine (1992), Leffler and Rucker (1991), Libecap and Smith (1999), Libecap and Wiggins (1984), Lyons (1994), Masten and Crocker (1985), Masten and Saussier (2002), …”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testing Organizational Economics Theories of Vertical Integration

Lajili¹,

Madunic²,

Mahoney³

Research Methodology in Strategy and Management

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This article classifies empirical research on vertical integration under four approaches -value-added-to-sales, qualitative-quantitative, input-output, and microanalytic. The emphasis here is on the microanalytic approach which has accumulated the most systematic evidence to support its theoretical propositions. In particular, this article emphasizes theoretical and empirical contributions from organizational economics (especially transaction costs and agency theories) for both vertical integration and (vertical) contracting. Limitations and methodological challenges concerning the empirical testing of theories of vertical integration are addressed and suggestions for further research are provided.

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“…Empirical studies on cost share contracts in other markets includeLeffler and Rucker (1991) focusing on timber contracts andHallagan (1978) on share contracting for gold, among others.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract duration and the division of labor in agricultural land leases

Yoder¹,

Hossain²,

Epplin³

et al. 2008

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Short-term contracts provide weak incentives for durable input investment if post-contract asset transfer is difficult. Our model shows that when both agents provide inputs, optimal contract length balances the weak incentives of one agent against the other's. This perspective broadens the existing contract duration literature, which emphasizes the tradeoff between risk sharing and contracting costs. We develop hypotheses and test them based on private grazing contracts from the Southern Great Plains. We find broad support for the implications of our model. For example, landowners provide durable land-specific inputs more often under annual than multi-year contracts.

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Share contracting for California Gold

Cited by 22 publications

References 9 publications

Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Franchising and Other Share Relationships?¹

Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Franchising and Other Share Relationships?¹

Testing Organizational Economics Theories of Vertical Integration

Contract duration and the division of labor in agricultural land leases

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Share contracting for California Gold

Cited by 22 publications

References 9 publications

Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Franchising and Other Share Relationships?1

Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Franchising and Other Share Relationships?1

Testing Organizational Economics Theories of Vertical Integration

Contract duration and the division of labor in agricultural land leases

Contact Info

Product

Resources

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Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Franchising and Other Share Relationships?¹

Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Franchising and Other Share Relationships?¹