Shared-constraint approach for multi-leader multi-follower game of generation companies participating in electricity markets with carbon emission trading mechanism

Lu, Zhilin; Liu, Mingbo; Lu, Wentian; Lin, Shunjiang

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.131424

Cited by 20 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…If the actual amount of new energy consumed by a large consumer is less than the amount specified in the renewable electricity consumption quota K, the large consumer needs to purchase excess consumption from the excess consumption market, of which q E,k,t is a positive value in this case. In addition, if the purchase of excess consumption is not enough, it is necessary to purchase tradable green certificates from the market to fulfill the renewable electricity consumption quota K. Where the transaction cost of tradable green certificates is I T k , the expansion is as follows [22]:…”

Section: ) Cost Function For Large Consumersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Construction and Application of the Double Game Model for Direct Purchase of Electricity by Large Consumers under Consideration of Risk Factors

Yu,

Zhang,

Cui

et al. 2024

Energies

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With the development of global clean energy and the implementation of carbon emission reduction policies, the direct purchase of electricity by large consumers has been increasingly promoted as a special form of electricity trading. Therefore, on the basis of the completion of low-carbon emission reduction targets in each country, how to rationalize the electricity purchase by large consumers in the electricity market so as to reduce their electricity purchase costs has become the main target of attention in each country. Currently, there are fewer studies in existing research on the direct electricity purchase strategy of large consumers under the consideration of the weight of consumption responsibility and risk. Based on this, this paper constructs a dual-game model for direct electricity purchase by large consumers based on the Stackelberg game and non-cooperative game theory. The concept of value at risk is further introduced, and the optimal strategy of direct electricity purchase by large consumers is proposed. The results of this study show that when market players make decisions on the purchase and sale of electricity, power suppliers will increase their biddings to obtain the highest returns, and large consumers can reduce the transaction costs by combining the medium- and long-term market with the spot market to purchase electricity. In the choice of electricity purchase market, with the increasing risk factor, large consumers shift from the risky spot market to the less risky medium- and long-term market and option market. This paper provides a reference for the issues of power suppliers’ contract bidding and large consumers’ electricity purchase strategy in the medium- and long-term contract transactions.

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Section: ) Cost Function For Large Consumersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Construction and Application of the Double Game Model for Direct Purchase of Electricity by Large Consumers under Consideration of Risk Factors

Yu,

Zhang,

Cui

et al. 2024

Energies

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“…In recent research, the existing research has the following shortcomings. Multi-segment biddings of GenCo are not considered in the model [6]. Rarely consider the day-ahead and real-time EM at the same time [7].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of wind and thermal power joint generation company’s participation in electric-carbon market

Zhao,

Li,

Zhou

et al. 2024

Eighth International Conference on Energy System, Electricity, and Power (ESEP 2023)

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The strategy of generation companies in the electricity market (EM) changes considering the carbon market (CM), not to mention considering joint biddings with new energy unit. This paper first describes a bi-level modeling framework for the participation of coal-fired unit and wind unit in electric-carbon markets. Secondly, the upper model, which is the bidding model for Collaborative generation company (GenCo), is established, and the lower models of electricity clearing model are built. Thirdly, the KKT condition is used to transform the lower model into the optimality conditions for the upper model. Finally, based on the modified IEEE-5 node system case, the electric-carbon market equilibrium problems are solved, and the decision-making behavior of the Collaborative GenCo is analyzed. The joint behavior of coal-fired unit and wind unit in the electric-carbon market is also analyzed. The results show that the carbon market reduces carbon emissions from the power system, and the joint behavior of coal-fired unit and wind unit increases their total profits in the electric-carbon market.

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“…In electricity spot markets, such as the Day-Ahead, Ancillary Services, and Intraday, decisions on submitted bids and offers in terms of price and quantity are made by electricity generation companies (GENCOs) to maximize their expected profit [2,3]. The formulation of an effective bidding strategy for GENCOs is deemed fundamental to the success of companies operating in this competitive environment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modified Genetic Algorithm for the Profit-Based Unit Commitment Problem in Competitive Electricity Market

Nepomuceno,

de Oliveira,

da Silva Junior

et al. 2023

Energies

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This article proposes a solution to the Profit-Based Unit Commitment (PBUC) problem to maximize the profit of a power generation company that owns thermal units and compressed air energy storage (CAES) systems, considering the Day-Ahead market. The proposed methodology is more realistic as it considers a mixed-integer nonlinear formulation of the PBUC. The problem is solved through two stages, with Stage 1 dedicated to obtaining the operational state of the generating units (On or Off) and the operation mode of the storage system (energy exchange: charging, discharging, idle). Stage 2 determines the dispatch of power from the thermoelectric units and the energy exchange in the storage system. The analysis of the system consisting of 20 thermoelectric units and three storage systems shows the efficiency of the proposed method in making decisions for the power generation company and is therefore promising for real-world applications.

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Shared-constraint approach for multi-leader multi-follower game of generation companies participating in electricity markets with carbon emission trading mechanism

Cited by 20 publications

References 27 publications

Construction and Application of the Double Game Model for Direct Purchase of Electricity by Large Consumers under Consideration of Risk Factors

Construction and Application of the Double Game Model for Direct Purchase of Electricity by Large Consumers under Consideration of Risk Factors

Analysis of wind and thermal power joint generation company’s participation in electric-carbon market

Modified Genetic Algorithm for the Profit-Based Unit Commitment Problem in Competitive Electricity Market

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