Shareholder Diversification, Bank Risk-Taking, and Capital Allocation Efficiency

García-Kuhnert, Yamileh; Marchica, Maria‐Teresa; Mura, Roberto

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2267962

“…Banking financial stability has been investigated in relation to a broad variety of determinants such as corporate governance Laeven and Levine [2009], competition Fiordelisi and Mare [2014], efficiency Fiordelisi et al [2011], the diversification strategy of shareholders García-Kuhnert et al [2013], creditor rights and information sharing Houston et al [2010]. It is paramount both under the regulatory and supervisory perspectives because it drives policy choices to assure the resilience and the functional working of the banking sector, along with optimal social welfare and economic growth.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonstationary Z-Score measures

Mare

¹

,

Moreira

²

,

Rossi

³

2017

European Journal of Operational Research

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In this work we develop advanced techniques for measuring bank insolvency risk. More specifically, we contribute to the existing body of research on the Z-Score. We develop bias reduction strategies for state-of-the-art Z-Score measures in the literature. We introduce novel estimators whose aim is to effectively capture nonstationary returns; for these estimators, as well as for existing ones in the literature, we discuss analytical confidence regions. We exploit moment-based error measures to assess the effectiveness of these estimators. We carry out an extensive empirical study that contrasts state-of-the-art estimators to our novel ones on over ten thousand banks. Finally, we contrast results obtained by using Z-score estimators against business news on the banking sector obtained from Factiva. Our work has important implications for researchers and practitioners. First, accounting for the degree of nonstationarity in returns yields a more accurate quantification of the degree of solvency. Second, our measure allows researchers to factor in the degree of uncertainty in the estimation due to the availability of data while estimating the overall risk of bank insolvency.JEL-Classification: C20, C60, G21

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Strong boards, ownership concentration and EU banks’ systemic risk-taking: Evidence from the financial crisis

Battaglia

¹

,

Gallo

²

2017

Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Mo

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This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Keywords: board composition; bank ownership; systemic risk; financial crisis JEL classification: G01; G21; G32 Permanent repository link IntroductionCorresponding authorThe role of corporate governance in banking has been highlighted by academics as well as by regulators and policy makers (see e.g. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010;Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010). Many academic studies emphasize how flaws in bank governance played a key role in the performance of banks during the crisis (Diamond and Rajan, 2009;Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010, Beltratti andStulz, 2012). Since the 2007, an increasing number of proposals and initiatives have attempted to identify and mitigate these flaws revealed by the financial crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009) aiming to promote better corporate governance standards in banking, while recognizing the special nature of banks when compared to other firms. On the other hand, the financial crisis revealed the dramatic impact of excessive risktaking behaviour of banks on the global financial stability, especially in terms of underestimated consequences of unregulated systemic risk-taking. As the literature has widely investigated poor or weak corporate governance as well as the increasing systemic nature of the banking sector as major causes of the crisis, to the best of our knowledge there is still a limited understanding of the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and banks' incentive to become more expose to systemic risk. As suggested by de Andres and Vallelado (2008), the aim of banking regulators to reduce the runs and their systemic consequences on the stability of the system might come into conflict with the main purpose of shareholders which is to improve the shareholders value by also increasing risk-taking. Taking on risks and tail and systemic risks, in particular, may enhance bank performance in the short run (i.e. by increasing the leverage), but it can cause significant damage to the institution and the whole system when such risks materialize (i.e. fire sales "effects"). During the global financial crisis, European banks exposed themselves to tail and systemic risks in various ways. Among others, the most recent literature has highlighted how European banks' exposures to tail risks in the form of shadow banking activities were later transformed into severe losses on the balance sheets (Acharya et al., 2013: Arteta et al., 2013).An increase in systemic and tail risks by large banks could be supported by the implicit too-big-to fail guarantee and the reduced market discipline (Acharya et al.,2010). In fact, it could be difficult, both for outsiders and insiders, to distinguish between risk-taking activities that generate high returns and those that offer high returns as compensation for taking tail risk through complex and opaque activities (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). In this context, the presence of a s...

show abstract

Nonstationary Z-Score Measures

Mare

¹

,

Moreira

²

,

Rossi

³

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this work we develop advanced techniques for measuring bank insolvency risk. More specifically, we contribute to the existing body of research on the Z-Score. We develop bias reduction strategies for state-of-the-art Z-Score measures in the literature. We introduce novel estimators whose aim is to effectively capture nonstationary returns; for these estimators, as well as for existing ones in the literature, we discuss analytical confidence regions. We exploit moment-based error measures to assess the effectiveness of these estimators. We carry out an extensive empirical study that contrasts state-of-the-art estimators to our novel ones on over ten thousand banks. Finally, we contrast results obtained by using Z-score estimators against business news on the banking sector obtained from Factiva. Our work has important implications for researchers and practitioners. First, accounting for the degree of nonstationarity in returns yields a more accurate quantification of the degree of solvency. Second, our measure allows researchers to factor in the degree of uncertainty in the estimation due to the availability of data while estimating the overall risk of bank insolvency.JEL-Classification: C20, C60, G21

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Shareholder Diversification, Bank Risk-Taking, and Capital Allocation Efficiency

Cited by 3 publications

References 124 publications

Nonstationary Z-Score measures

Nonstationary Z-Score measures

Strong boards, ownership concentration and EU banks’ systemic risk-taking: Evidence from the financial crisis

Nonstationary Z-Score Measures

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