2021
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3765575
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Shareholder Meetings Uncertainty: Evidence from the Options Market

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Cited by 2 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Shareholder participation in general meetings (SPGM) is an important part of corporate governance in publicly-traded companies (e.g., Apostolides, 2010;Bebchuk, 2005;Krishnan & Ye, 2005). Theoretically, higher SPGM is desirable, as it serves the interests of shareholders by giving them a stronger voice regarding important governance issues (Holland et al, 2021;Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), 2016;SEC, 2018a;SEC, 2018b) and leads to a broader reflection of shareholders' interests in the corporate governance processes (e.g., ISS, 2016;Stratling, 2003). Furthermore, higher SPGM provides shareholders with a better opportunity to hold management accountable and may prevent managers from engaging in opportunistic behaviors (e.g., Mayhew & Pike, 2004).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Shareholder participation in general meetings (SPGM) is an important part of corporate governance in publicly-traded companies (e.g., Apostolides, 2010;Bebchuk, 2005;Krishnan & Ye, 2005). Theoretically, higher SPGM is desirable, as it serves the interests of shareholders by giving them a stronger voice regarding important governance issues (Holland et al, 2021;Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), 2016;SEC, 2018a;SEC, 2018b) and leads to a broader reflection of shareholders' interests in the corporate governance processes (e.g., ISS, 2016;Stratling, 2003). Furthermore, higher SPGM provides shareholders with a better opportunity to hold management accountable and may prevent managers from engaging in opportunistic behaviors (e.g., Mayhew & Pike, 2004).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In contrast, Holland et al (2021) argues that previous literature fails to find significant market reactions around shareholder meetings because investors constantly update their beliefs on meeting outcomes over a long horizon, in a way that short window stock return event studies cannot fully capture market reactions. Using option implied volatility to assess the information content of annual shareholder meetings, Holland et al (2021) document that implied volatility gradually declines from record date for an annual meeting until the meeting date, suggesting that shareholders anticipate meeting outcomes.…”
Section: Evasive Shareholder Meetingsmentioning
confidence: 81%