2015
DOI: 10.1007/s11408-015-0256-2
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Shareholder voting and merger returns

Abstract: Using a sample of 384 shareholder meetings, I investigate whether shareholder votes on mergers and acquisitions in both target and acquirer firms are related to announcement day abnormal returns and whether the voting outcome has implications for the short-and long-run merger performance. I find that shareholder voting dissent is negatively related to both abnormal returns upon merger announcement and recommendations by the Institutional Shareholder Services. The former relationship is stronger for target firm… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1

Citation Types

0
1
0

Year Published

2020
2020
2020
2020

Publication Types

Select...
1

Relationship

0
1

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 1 publication
(1 citation statement)
references
References 42 publications
0
1
0
Order By: Relevance
“…A number of high profile failures in the corporate governance realm have led academics and regulators to consider reinforcing the voting rights of shareholders (Henning, 2015). The shareholder vote is one of the most powerful means for shareholders to engage with the boards of directors of their investee companies (Mallin and Melis, 2012; Germann and Serdült, 2017); and regulators have emphasized the need for corporations to adopt new technologies to promote the voting rights of shareholders (SEC 2008, No.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A number of high profile failures in the corporate governance realm have led academics and regulators to consider reinforcing the voting rights of shareholders (Henning, 2015). The shareholder vote is one of the most powerful means for shareholders to engage with the boards of directors of their investee companies (Mallin and Melis, 2012; Germann and Serdült, 2017); and regulators have emphasized the need for corporations to adopt new technologies to promote the voting rights of shareholders (SEC 2008, No.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%