2016
DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2015.08.003
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Shareholders have a say in executive compensation: Evidence from say-on-pay in the United States

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Cited by 73 publications
(88 citation statements)
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“…The higher compensation the top executives receive, the more environmental information disclosure there will be (Norhasimah et al, 2016). Top executives of listed companies have the right to discuss the compensation, which is a reasonable corporate governance mechanism (Marinilka et al, 2016;Steven et al, 2016). Top executives' compensation system of listed companies has incentive effects on top executives' behaviors (Huang et al, 2009 Zhang et al (2012) believes that the proportion of top executives' shareholding is related to disclosure.…”
Section: Top Executives' Compensationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The higher compensation the top executives receive, the more environmental information disclosure there will be (Norhasimah et al, 2016). Top executives of listed companies have the right to discuss the compensation, which is a reasonable corporate governance mechanism (Marinilka et al, 2016;Steven et al, 2016). Top executives' compensation system of listed companies has incentive effects on top executives' behaviors (Huang et al, 2009 Zhang et al (2012) believes that the proportion of top executives' shareholding is related to disclosure.…”
Section: Top Executives' Compensationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Studies have explored the direct relationship between the Say on Pay policy and corporate performance (Cuñat et al, 2013) or firm value (Correa & Lel, 2016;Fischer, Gramlich, Miller, & White, 2009). Some such studies have focused on the United States (Kimbro & Xu, 2016), while others have focused on the banking industry (Yahr, 2013). Therefore, Proposition 1: Financial variables and performance indicators influence voting behavior in shareholder meetings.…”
Section: Voting Decisions and Proxy Votingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They therefore conclude that the Say‐on‐Pay regime had a minimal impact in actually curbing the growth of executive pay in the United States. Conversely, Kimbro and Xu () find support for the notion that Say‐on‐Pay can indeed moderate the growth of CEO pay in future periods. The curbing of pay is found to be strongest when shareholder dissent is high in poorly performing firms and where shareholders strongly reject a remuneration report.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%