Sharing Experiences in Infancy: From Primary Intersubjectivity to Shared Intentionality

Abstract

We contrast two theses that make different assumptions about the developmental onset of human-unique sociality. The primary intersubjectivity thesis (PIT) argues that humans relate to each other in distinct ways from the beginning of life, as is shown by newborns' participation in face-to-face encounters or “primary intersubjectivity.” According to this thesis, humans' innate relational capacity is the seedbed from which all subsequent social-emotional and social-cognitive developments continuously emerge. The shared intentionality thesis (SIT) states that human-unique forms of interaction develop at 9–12 months of age, when infants put their heads together with others in acts of object-focused joint attention and simple collaborative activities. According to this thesis, human-unique cognition emerges rapidly with the advent of mind-reading capacities that evolved specifically for the purpose of coordination. In this paper, we first contrast the two theses and then sketch the outlines of an account that unifies their strengths. This unified account endorses the PIT's recognition of the fundamental importance of primary intersubjectivity. Any act of sharing experiences is founded on the communicative capacity that is already displayed by young infants in primary intersubjectivity. At the same time, we question the PIT's interpretation that dyadic encounters have the triadic structure of joint attention. Lastly, we draw on empirical work on the development of joint attention, imitation, and social referencing that serves as evidence that primary intersubjectivity continuously unfolds into the capacity for triadic joint attention.

Showing and giving: from incipient to conventional forms

“…Alternatively, cases such as these may represent ‘transitional forms’ between dyadic and triadic engagements, in that it is not clear that the infant was drawing the adult's attention to the object, but the act of raising the object was salient within the engagement. On this view, objects are gradually included within the engagement, as infants become increasingly aware of the role they can play in interactions, and as caregivers increasingly react to the inclusion of objects by infants [ 32 , 33 ].…”

Two modes of being together: The levels of intersubjectivity and human relatedness in neuroscience and psychoanalytic thinking

“…Research shows that impairments in the bodily self-monitoring may undermine reflective self-other representations ( Tsakiris, 2017 ). At the same time, no clear continuity can be established between the quality of early intersubjective experience and future metalizing capacities ( Moll et al, 2021 ).…”

“…As reported, earlier forms of intentional attributions that are based on simulation are insufficient to justify this complexity, and other mental prerequisites must be achieved by the infant. Indeed, current research shows that the quality of contingent intersubjective exchanges does not predict the quality of later intentional attributions ( Moll et al, 2021 ): the new level of mentalistic understanding should be supported by a wider capacity—i.e., TOM ( Baron-Cohen, 1991 ) or reflective functioning ( Fonagy et al, 2002 ).…”

Language, Childhood, and Fire: How We Learned to Love Sharing Stories

“…Both caregivers and children learn to coordinate vocalization in the shared tasks. To effectively communicate and collaborate, both sides must develop a shared understanding of each other's intentions (Trevarthen, 1979;Murray and Trevarthen, 1986;Moll et al, 2021) and a growing sensitivity for the differences in vocalization. To this day, motherese is not a holistic, non-phrasal language but rather a language with strong pragmatics, highly controlled prosody, and a rapidly complex and recursive syntax.…”