Sharing rules and the commons: evidence from Ha'apai, Tonga

Abstract

This paper argues that sharing rules have served to reduce the inefficiency caused by common pool externalities in many developing societies. To this end, a twosector model of renewable resource use is employed where sharing rules are interpreted as implicit resource taxes. The model is applied to the island economy of Lofanga in the Kingdom of Tonga. The model generates a growth pattern which is consistent with the observed time paths of population and the resource stock. Cyclical fluctuations are weak even in the absence of resource taxation because the intrinsic growth rate of the resource is high. This paper is published posthumously, due to the tragic death of the author on 1 December 2002.

The Effects of Communication on the Partnership Solution to the Commons

“…The Japanese fishermen's output-sharing schemes are similar to a fixed-group sharing scheme practiced by 'Uihan fishermen in Tonga in the South Pacific (Bender et al 2002). This is in contrast with Lofangan fishermen, also from Tonga, who use a random-group informal sharing system (Chakraborty 2004) and have a significantly larger catch per unit of effort (Bender et al 2002). These empirical observations illustrate the importance of carefully examining the influence of the type of partnership organization on the effectiveness of common pool resource management.…”

Fishing for fortunes?

“…In more recent times, this system has progressed to encompass not only the sharing of food, including fish, but all kinds of goods and money-matters. Thus, within a system that restrains incentives for increased efforts and gain-maximising strategies, it is still deemed prestigious to reach a level of productivity that allows sharing and thus raises the social status of the provider (Chakraborty, 2002).…”

Assessing Marine Resource Exploitation in Lofanga, Tonga: One Case Study—Two Approaches

“…A need for cash income is conceded, but a major part of this cash is assumed to be used for social obligations, thus emphasizing traditional values rather than weakening them. With regard to resource exploitation we proposed that, while institutions seem to be necessary to protect open access resources (Feeny et al, 1990), solidarity networks within communities may substitute for access regulations (Chakraborty, 2002(Chakraborty, , 2004. Overexploitation, if occurring at all, may then result from socially defined needs and competition aggravated by structural traps.…”