Sharing with the powerless third: Other-regarding preferences in dynamic bargaining

Schwaninger, Manuel

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2022.03.002

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…When the distribution problem involves heterogeneous needs and need thresholds are transparent, agreements tend to adapt accordingly: they usually satisfy the need thresholds of the agreeing dyad and frequently also satisfy the need thresholds of third network members (Kittel et al, 2020 ). In these studies, the share allocated to the third network member increases with prosociality of the strong network member’s and, to a lesser extent, the weak agreeing network member’s prosociality (Schwaninger, 2022 ). These results imply that the satisfaction of others’ needs in a collective is more than the result of individual social value orientations; they reveal the presence of pro-social norms.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Summarizing Simmel ( 1964 ), Yoon et al ( 2013 , 1457) argue that “triads tend to constrain emotions, reduce individuality, and generate behavioral convergences or uniformity because of ‘two against one’. Triads also allow for competition and coalition formation because individual fairness perceptions within dyads and across all network members may vary (Schwaninger, 2022 ). Furthermore, the three-line is a commonly observed social structure (Burt, 1992 ), which generates a power differential between network members (Skvoretz & Willer, 1993 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 8 An alternative would be to administer the social value orientations measure at the end of the experiment. However, this sequence can influence the results of the measure significantly, while the influence of an other-regarding measure on the bargaining outcomes remains insignificant when the experiment reveals the outcome of the measures only at the end of the experiment (Schwaninger, 2022 ). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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More Satisfaction, Less Equality: Distributive Effects of Transparent Needs in a Laboratory Experiment

Kittel,

Neuhofer,

Schwaninger

2024

Soc Just Res

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Societies are confronted with the dilemma that need satisfaction requires transparent individual needs. We study the effect of information about others’ needs on the distribution of a joint endowment in a three-player network exchange game in a laboratory experiment. Need levels are exogenously given and either transparent (known to all three network members) or opaque (only known to the players themselves). The three players negotiate in dyads until two players agree on a distribution. We expect that the transparency of need thresholds raises need satisfaction but lowers equality. The results suggest that the members of the dyad who agree on the distribution can satisfy their own need thresholds even when information about thresholds is opaque. The effect of transparency on the remaining network member is antithetical: while transparency increases the rate of need satisfaction, it decreases the average share of allocations when needs are low. In the opaque condition, allocated shares are larger, but need satisfaction is lower. This reveals the ambivalent distributive effects of transparent need thresholds: Transparency helps those with the highest need thresholds, but it can hurt those with lower need thresholds, and it barely affects the ones with the most influence on the decision.

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Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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More Satisfaction, Less Equality: Distributive Effects of Transparent Needs in a Laboratory Experiment

Kittel,

Neuhofer,

Schwaninger

2024

Soc Just Res

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Taxed fairly? How differences in perception shape attitudes towards progressive taxation

Kalleitner,

Bobzien

2023

European Sociological Review

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Empirically, the poor are more likely to support increases in the level of tax progressivity than the rich. Such income-stratified tax preferences can result from differences in preferences of what should be taxed as argued by previous literature. However, it may also result from income-stratified perceptions of what is taxed. This paper argues that the rich perceive higher levels of tax progressivity than the poor and that tax perceptions affect individuals’ support for progressive taxation. Using data from an Austrian survey experiment, we test this argument in three steps: First, in line with past research, we show that individuals’ income positions are connected to individuals’ tax preferences as a self-interest rationale would predict. However, second, we show that this variation is mainly driven by income-stratified tax perceptions. Third, randomly informing a subset of the sample about actual tax rates, we find that changing tax perceptions causally affects support for redistributive taxation among those who initially overestimated the level of tax progressivity. Our results indicate that tax perceptions are relevant for forming tax preferences and suggest that individuals are more polarized in their perceptions of who pays how much taxes than in their support for who should pay how much tax.

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Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories

Fudenberg

Gao

Liang³

2020

SSRN Journal

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Sharing with the powerless third: Other-regarding preferences in dynamic bargaining

Cited by 3 publications

References 49 publications

More Satisfaction, Less Equality: Distributive Effects of Transparent Needs in a Laboratory Experiment

More Satisfaction, Less Equality: Distributive Effects of Transparent Needs in a Laboratory Experiment

Taxed fairly? How differences in perception shape attitudes towards progressive taxation

Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories

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