1990
DOI: 10.1086/261721
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Shark Repellents and Managerial Myopia: An Empirical Test

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Cited by 168 publications
(98 citation statements)
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References 13 publications
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“…Unfortunately there is little literature on the direct impact of expanded boards or of tighter corporate governance more generally on innovation. While earlier literature found a negative relationship between anti-takeover provisions and innovation investments (e.g., Meulbroek, et al 1990), a recent study (O'Connor & Rafferty, 2012) finds no relation between broad measures of corporate governance and innovation levels once simultaneity is taken into account in their empirical models.…”
Section: Literaturementioning
confidence: 84%
“…Unfortunately there is little literature on the direct impact of expanded boards or of tighter corporate governance more generally on innovation. While earlier literature found a negative relationship between anti-takeover provisions and innovation investments (e.g., Meulbroek, et al 1990), a recent study (O'Connor & Rafferty, 2012) finds no relation between broad measures of corporate governance and innovation levels once simultaneity is taken into account in their empirical models.…”
Section: Literaturementioning
confidence: 84%
“…In terms of R&D, managers in the United States or in France, for example, are likely to either choose to comply with their national accountancy schemes or to 2 Some empirical works considered a global set of anti-takeover provisions likely to encompass many entrenchment practices. The different practices, especially the voting rules, are however not disentangled in these contributions where anti-takeover practices were found to be either detrimental (Meulbroek et al, 1990), neutral (Johnson and Rao, 1997) or positive (Pugh et al, 1992) for R&D intensity.…”
Section: Randd Decisions and The Defense Of Shareholders' Rightsmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Meulbroek et al (1990) show that firms decrease R&D expenditures after adopting anti-takeover amendments. However, Pugh et al (1992) find evidence that R&D expenditures rise after amendment adoptions.…”
Section: Relation To the Existing Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%