Shedding an ethnic identity in diaspora: de-Turkification and the transnational discursive struggles of the Kurdish diaspora

Abstract

This article analyses how Kurdish diaspora (from Turkey) engage in de-Turkification, that is correcting, interrupting and shedding the intense Turkification and assimilation which Kurds have been recipients of in Turkey. As 'everyday critical discourse analysts' Kurdish mobilized actors identify, challenge and ideologically unpack the Turkishness manifest in their (Kurdish) interlocutors' discourses via three means: inclusion, exclusion and repositioning. The article also identifies that self-definition amongst Kurds in London is shifting as previously self-identified 'Turkish economic migrants' over time become 'Kurdish diaspora'. Rather than examining the often-discussed belonging ties of diasporas, it traces the critical interruptions and corrections Kurdish actors undertake in order to de-Turkify. The focus is on how an identity is being shed, rather than gained. In so doing, the article contributes to an understanding of the process of removal of asymmetric discourses

Where news could not inspire change: TRT World as a party broadcaster

“…‘Turkification’ is a term used to describe a central strategy associated with the Turkish nation-building project, a strategy of creating a dominant and homogenised Turkish identity ( Demir, 2017 ). A similar process was undertaken at TRT World to ‘Turkify’ the organisation.…”

“We share the same ancestry”: US Kurdish diasporas and the aspirational and ascriptive practices of race

“…Kurds are the "fourth-largest ethnic group in West Asia, outnumbered only by Arabs, Turks, and Persians" (Mojab 2001). There are thirty million to forty million Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, with large diasporas in Europe (Demir 2017;Eliassi 2013) and a growing diaspora in the United States (de Rouen 2019). Nashville has the largest US Kurdish community, with nearly 20,000 Kurds from mostly Iraq and some from Iran (Arpacik 2019;Thangaraj 2019) Another group of several thousand formally educated Iraqi Kurds came post-1996 on "Special Immigrant Visas" (SIVs), which are reserved for people working with the US military, USAID, and NGOs as interpreters, translators, and guides.…”

“…Language was instrumental to the SWANA nations' and Turkish nation's assimilationist projects aimed at erasing Kurdish language, history, and culture. Practicing Kurdish language in the diaspora democratizes language use and is an attempt to erase the inequalities built into language in the SWANA region and in Turkey (Demir 2017). For Kurds frequently subjected to state violence, Kurdish linguistic and cultural practices become symbolic, performative, affective, desirable, and unifying while constituting a historical necessity.…”

“Aspirational Capital” and Transformations in First-generation Alevi-Kurdish Parents’ Involvement with Their Children’s Education in the UK

“…Initially, the Alevis joined established Kurdish community centres that mobilised around left-wing and Kurdish politics (Demir, 2012) until the London Alevi Community Centre and Cemevi (LACCC) opened in 1993 to provide religious, cultural, political and educational functions. This reflected a reversal of the position of Alevis as a "twice minority" in Turkey to becoming a majority among the London Kurdish community (Demir, 2017). Demir explains this transition to an Alevi identity as a shift in self-definition to reposition themselves primarily in terms of a religious identity rather than their Kurdish ethnic identity.…”