Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators

Rott, Hans

doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-9084-4_14

Cited by 83 publications

(99 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Examples range from "hard" information change provided by public announcements or public observations [20] to softer signals encoding different policies of belief revision (cf. [22]) by radical or more conservative upgrades of plausibility orderings. Other dynamic logics describe acts of inference or introspection that raise "awareness" [36,34], and of questions that modify the focus of a current process of inquiry [32].…”

Section: Evidence Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Logics of Evidence-Based Beliefs

2011

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Link to publication General rightsIt is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulationsIf you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. Dynamic Logics of Evidence-Based BeliefsDedicated to Professor Ryszard Wójcicki on the occasion of his 80th birthday * Abstract. This paper adds evidence structure to standard models of belief, in the form of families of sets of worlds. We show how these more fine-grained models support natural actions of "evidence management", ranging from update with external new information to internal rearrangement. We show how this perspective leads to new richer languages for existing neighborhood semantics for modal logic. Our main results are relative completeness theorems for the resulting dynamic logic of evidence.

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Section: Evidence Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Logics of Evidence-Based Beliefs

2011

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“…The type of change we are interested in is how a model M G of a game G incorporates new information about what the players should do (according to a particular choice rule). As is well known from the belief revision literature, there are many ways to transform a plausibility model given some new information [28]. We do not have the space to survey the entire body of relevant literature here (cf., [35,7]).…”

Section: A Primer On Belief Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Dynamic Analysis of Interactive Rationality

Pacuit¹,

Roy²

2016

Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science

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Abstract. Epistemic game theory has shown the importance of informational contexts in understanding strategic interaction. We propose a general framework to analyze how such contexts may arise. The idea is to view informational contexts as the fixed-points of iterated, "rational responses" to incoming information about the agents' possible choices. We show general conditions for the stabilization of such sequences of rational responses, in terms of structural properties of both the decision rule and the information update policy. Background and MotivationAn increasingly popular 3 view is that "the fundamental insight of game theory [is] that a rational player must take into account that the players reason about each other in deciding how to play" [6, pg. 81]. Exactly how the players (should) incorporate the fact that they are interacting with other (actively reasoning) agents into their own decision making process is the subject of much debate. A variety of frameworks explicitly model the reasoning of rational agents in a strategic situation. Key examples include Brian Skyrms' models of "dynamic deliberation" [32], Ken Binmore's analysis of "eductive reasoning" [11], and Robin Cubitt and Robert Sugden's "common modes of reasoning" [17]. Although the details of these frameworks are quite different they share a common line of thought: In contrast to classical game theory, solution concepts are no longer the basic object of study. Instead, the "rational solutions" of a game are the result of individual (rational) decisions in specific informational "contexts".This perspective on the foundations of game theory is best exemplified by the so-called epistemic program in game theory (cf. [15]). The central thesis here is that the basic mathematical model of a game should include an explicit parameter describing the players' informational attitudes. However, this broadly decision-theoretic stance does not simply reduce the question of decision-making in interaction to that of rational decision making in the face of uncertainty or ignorance. Crucially, higher-order information (belief about beliefs, etc.)

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“…Public Announcements of Soft Facts: The "Lexicographic Upgrade" To allow for soft belief revision, an operation ⇑ ϕ was introduced in [98], essentially adapting to public announcements the 'lexicographic' policy for belief revision described in [79]. This operation, called lexicographic update consists of changing the current plausibility order on any given state model as follows: all ϕ-worlds become more plausible than all ¬ϕ-worlds, and within the two zones, the old ordering remains.…”

Section: Belief Change Under Hard Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They were all introduced by van Benthem in [98] as dynamic multi-agent versions of revision operators previously considered by Rott [79] and other authors. In each case, we give here only one example of a reduction law, namely the analogue for belief of the DEL Action-Knowledge Axiom which we mentioned in Section 5.5.…”

Section: The Dynamic Logic Of Belief Changementioning

confidence: 99%