Shilling, Squeezing, Sniping. A further explanation for late bidding in online second-price auctions

Barbaro, Salvatore; Bracht, Bernd

doi:10.1016/j.jbef.2021.100553

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…[Haile, Tamer 2003], [Canals-Cerdá, Pearcy 2013])); 2) models taking into account actual bids (bids of actual/active bidders (e.g. [Barbaro et al 2006], [de Haan et al 2008], [Namazi, Schadschneider 2006], [Roth and Ockenfels 2000])). In both cases (potential and actual bids), stochastic modeling of the sequence of bid values is reduced to the determination of an appropriately selected (finite) sequence of random variables.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On joint distribution of bids in some k-th price auction model

Stachura,

Wodecka

2024

QME

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In the era of increasingly widespread use of electronic communication tools, constant growth of e-commerce turnover is hardly surprising. One of its mechanisms are online auctions whose turnover, on a global scale, is enormous. This paper proposes a stochastic model of the value of subsequent actual bids appearing in the course of a dynamic internet k-th price auction. On this basis, it was possible to determine unconditional joint probability distributions, as well as univariate marginal distributions of successive bids appearing in the course of the auction type under consideration.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On joint distribution of bids in some k-th price auction model

Stachura,

Wodecka

2024

QME

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“…Over the last two decades internet auctions attracted much attention [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12], both because of their large commercial success but also because of some interesting empirical evidence concerning bidders' behavior, which has been considered as puzzling. This paper focuses on one such main intriguing features, the so called "late 1 3 bidding" phenomenon also named sniping, first identified by Roth-Ockenfels [13] in sale auctions conducted by the eBay and Amazon sites [14,15]. The two auction sites adopted a "second price" design, which can either be seen as an extension to a dynamic context of the Vickrey (1961) second-price sealed bid auction, or alternatively as a generalization of the standard oral English ascending auction.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Last minute only bidding is implausible in eBay sealed bid type-of-auctions

Dimitri

2022

Electron Commer Res

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In recent years internet auctions have attracted much attention. This paper discusses the "last minute bidding" (sniping) phenomenon, first investigated by Roth and Ockenfels (American Economic Review 92, 1093-1103) in eBay, fixed-end, auctions. Unlike standard auctions where each offer is processed by the auctioneer due to system traffic, and connection time, in eBay auctions very late bids may be left unprocessed. In the paper we consider a simple two-players, two-periods sealed-bid auction model, inspired by eBay auctions, with private values and complete information. The main difference with respect to e-Bay auctions is given by the first period. Indeed, players can submit at most one bid per period. In the first stage bids are processed with certainty by the system while in the second stage, with positive probability, bids may not be processed due to system congestion. Unlike eBay we show how in this model last minute, that is second stage only, bidding may have low plausibility, as it can be a Nash equilibrium only under very specific circumstances and is never a unique best reply. Intuitively this is because the first stage is sealed-bid, with at most one offer per bidder, and players have no guarantee that they could outbid the opponent in the second period, once after the first round they realise that their bid is not the best.

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An evolutionary approach to deception in multi-agent systems

Broin

O’Riordan

2007

Artif Intell Rev

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Understanding issues of trust and deception are key to designing robust, reliable multi-agent systems. This paper builds on previous work which examined the use of auctions as a model for exploring the concept of deception in such systems. We have previously described two forms of deceptive behaviour which can occur in a simulated repeated English auction. The first of these types of deception involves sniping or late bidding, which not only allows an agent to conceal its true valuation for an item, but also potentially allows it to win an item for which it may not possess the highest valuation. The second deceptive strategy involves the placing of false bids which are designed to reduce an opponent's potential profit. In this work we examine the potential shortcomings of those two strategies and investigate whether or not their individual strengths can be combined to produce a successful hybrid deceptive strategy.

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Shilling, Squeezing, Sniping. A further explanation for late bidding in online second-price auctions

Cited by 4 publications

References 20 publications

On joint distribution of bids in some k-th price auction model

On joint distribution of bids in some k-th price auction model

Last minute only bidding is implausible in eBay sealed bid type-of-auctions

An evolutionary approach to deception in multi-agent systems

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