Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

Abstract

Assertions are our standard communicative tool for sharing and acquiring information. Recent empirical studies seemingly provide converging evidence that assertions are subject to a factive norm: you are entitled to assert a proposition p only if p is true. All these studies, however, assume that we can treat participants' judgments about what an agent 'should say' as evidence of their intuitions about assertability. This paper argues that this assumption is incorrect, so that the conclusions drawn in these studies are unwarranted. It shows that most people do not interpret statements about what an agent 'should say' as statements about assertability, but rather as statements about what is in the agent's interest to do. It identifies some effective measures to force the intended reading of statements about what an agent 'should say', and shows that when these measures are implemented, people's judgments consistently and overwhelmingly align with non-factive accounts of assertion.

Truth: The Rule or the Aim of Assertion?

“…Cappelen 2011;Pagin 2016;Marsili 2019). 13 For theoretical arguments, see Douven (2006), Lackey (2007), Kvanvig (2009), McKinnon (2015, Pelling (2011Pelling ( , 2013; for empirical counterevidence, Kneer (2018), Reuter and Brössel (2019), Marsili and Wiegmann (2021).…”

“… 10 For an empirical study that bears on whether (B) is true, see also Marsili and Wiegmann (2021: fn 14 and §5.2).…”