Sibling Rivalry and Strategic Parental Transfers

Chang, Yang‐Ming; Weisman, Dennis L.

doi:10.2307/20062082

Cited by 27 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Recent theoretical contributions to the economics of inter-family interactions highlight the importance of sibling rivalry in providing care/attention to parents with the objective of strategically influencing the latter's inheritance decision, given that parents are also strategic manipulators who, at the same time, display altruistic feelings towards their children (see Chang and Weisman, 2005;Chang, 2009;Chang, 2012;and Chang and Luo 2015). In line with this strand of the literature, we develop a two-period overlapping generations model as a two-stage Nash game that integrates parental altruism and sibling rivalry for family resources with endogenous bequest formation, strategic manipulation of children's behavior, and endogenous saving.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Do Children Take Care of Their Elderly Parents? Are the Japanese Any Different?

Horioka¹,

Gahramanov²,

Hayat³

et al. 2016

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In this paper, we conduct a theoretical analysis of why individuals provide care and attention to their elderly parents using a two-period overlapping generations model with endogenous saving and a "contest success function" and test this model using micro data from a Japanese household survey, the Osaka University Preference Parameter Study. To summarize our main findings, we find that the Japanese are more likely to live with (or near) their elderly parents and/or to provide care and attention to them if they expect to receive a bequest from them, which constitutes strong support for the selfish bequest motive or the exchange motive (much stronger than in the United States), but we find that their caregiving behavior is also heavily influenced by the strength of their altruism toward their parents and social norms.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Do Children Take Care of Their Elderly Parents? Are the Japanese Any Different?

Horioka¹,

Gahramanov²,

Hayat³

et al. 2016

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“…It should be mentioned at the outset that the present paper differs from those of Chang and Weisman (2005) and Chang (2009) in two important aspects. First, these two studies adopt the assumption that children maximize income in the allocation of time between family services and labor market activities, without allowing for the consumption of leisure.…”

mentioning

confidence: 75%

Strategic transfers, redistributive fiscal policies, and family bonds: a micro-economic analysis

Chang

2011

J Popul Econ

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This paper presents a micro-economic model to analyze intergenerational exchange in which the utility maximizing decisions of "selfish" children on family services, labor market activities, and leisure are determined endogenously. We show that altruistic parents' financial transfers have a disincentive effect on the labor supply of their children and that the children's equilibrium income is positively correlated with parental income. Based on the theoretical model, we find that redistributing US$1 from children to their parents increases parental transfers by less than US$1, implying that intergenerational public transfers are Ricardian non-neutral. However, the nonneutral redistributive transfers may enhance intergenerational family bonds because the equilibrium levels of services rendered by children to their parents increase.

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“…Note that (2) implies that the individual does not enjoy the time/attention he provides to his parent, an assumption that is often made in this strand of the literature. Existing studies assume that such services do not have close market substitutes and difference in the results, with Chang and Weisman (2005) and Chang (2009) and us obtaining diametrically opposed results regarding the impact of the number of siblings on the equilibrium amount of care and attention and on the equilibrium bequest level.…”

Section: An Altruistic-strategic Bequest Model With Sibling Rivalry Amentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Our model is a two-period overlapping-generations model with a two-stage Nash game that integrates parental altruism and sibling rivalry for family resources with endogenous bequest formation, strategic manipulation of children's behavior, and endogenous saving. It builds on recent theoretical contributions but improves upon existing models by being the first to endogenize saving and the first after Chang and Weisman (2005), Chang (2009Chang ( , 2012, and Chang and Luo (2015) to use a contest success function to model the rivalry among siblings for parental bequests.…”

Section: An Altruistic-strategic Bequest Model With Sibling Rivalry Amentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We would like to emphasize that, despite considerable evidence of intergenerational conflict and rivalry among children, the literature on family transfers mostly ignores the issue of sibling rivalry for parental transfers (see, for example, Buchanan 1983;Chang 2009; and the many excellent references therein). As developed in Chang and Weisman (2005) and Chang (2009), in close parallel to the traditional literature on rent seeking (Tullock 1980;Skaperdas 1996), the CSF is a convenient and straightforward way of modeling children as "transfer seekers" within a strategic intergenerational and intragenerational interactions setting. 2 That is, given parents' wish to allocate financial wealth within their families while also enjoying some care and attention from their offspring, a CSF enables us to model children's desire to engage in sibling rivalry for parental transfers.…”

Section: An Altruistic-strategic Bequest Model With Sibling Rivalry Amentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why Do Children Take Care of Their Elderly Parents? Are the Japanese Any Different?

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Asian Development Bank InstituteThe Working Paper series is a continuation of the formerly named Discussion Paper series; the numbering of the papers continued without interruption or change. ADBI's working papers reflect initial ideas on a topic and are posted online for discussion. ADBI encourages readers to post their comments on the main page for each working paper (given in the citation below). Some working papers may develop into other forms of publication. Charles Yuji Horioka is vice president and research professor at the Asian Growth Research Institute, Kitakyushu, Japan. Emin Gahramanov is associate professor at the American University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. Aziz Hayat and Xueli Tang are senior lecturers at Deakin University, Melbourne Burwood Campus, Burwood, Australia.The views expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of ADBI, ADB, its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.Working papers are subject to formal revision and correction before they are finalized and considered published. AbstractWe conduct a theoretical and empirical analysis of why children live with (or near) their parents and provide care and assistance to them using microdata from a Japanese household survey, the Osaka University Preference Parameter Study. We find that the Japanese are more likely to live with (or near) their elderly parents and/or to provide care and attention to them if they expect to receive a bequest from them, which constitutes strong support for the strategic bequest motive, but that their caregiving behavior is also heavily influenced by the strength of their altruism toward their parents and social norms.

show abstract

Sibling Rivalry and Strategic Parental Transfers

Cited by 27 publications

References 25 publications

Why Do Children Take Care of Their Elderly Parents? Are the Japanese Any Different?

Why Do Children Take Care of Their Elderly Parents? Are the Japanese Any Different?

Strategic transfers, redistributive fiscal policies, and family bonds: a micro-economic analysis

Why Do Children Take Care of Their Elderly Parents? Are the Japanese Any Different?

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