Side-Channel Analysis of the TERO PUF

Tebelmann, Lars; Pehl, Michael; Immler, Vincent

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-16350-1_4

Cited by 17 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Most cPUFs generate only a finite, albeit possibly exponential (in some desired security parameters), number of CRPs [11]. However, most of them remain vulnerable against different attacks like side-channel [50,11] and machine-learning [19,44,43,28]. Thus, considering the importance of cPUFs as a hardware security primitive in several real-world applications, on one hand, [11,26,15,2,33,30,36] 1 and the recent advances in quantum technology, on the other hand, it is worth investigating whether quantum technologies could boost the security of cPUFs or if they, on the contrary, threaten their security.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum Physical Unclonable Functions: Possibilities and Impossibilities

Arapinis

Delavar

Doosti

et al. 2021

Quantum

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A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a device with unique behaviour that is hard to clone hence providing a secure fingerprint. A variety of PUF structures and PUF-based applications have been explored theoretically as well as being implemented in practical settings. Recently, the inherent unclonability of quantum states has been exploited to derive the quantum analogue of PUF as well as new proposals for the implementation of PUF. We present the first comprehensive study of quantum Physical Unclonable Functions (qPUFs) with quantum cryptographic tools. We formally define qPUFs, encapsulating all requirements of classical PUFs as well as introducing a new testability feature inherent to the quantum setting only. We use a quantum game-based framework to define different levels of security for qPUFs: quantum exponential unforgeability, quantum existential unforgeability and quantum selective unforgeability. We introduce a new quantum attack technique based on the universal quantum emulator algorithm of Marvin and Lloyd to prove no qPUF can provide quantum existential unforgeability. On the other hand, we prove that a large family of qPUFs (called unitary PUFs) can provide quantum selective unforgeability which is the desired level of security for most PUF-based applications.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum Physical Unclonable Functions: Possibilities and Impossibilities

Arapinis

Delavar

Doosti

et al. 2021

Quantum

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“…Knowledge of the oscillation duration allows for reducing the PUF's entropy. The leakage stems from counters that are placed in an interleaved manner [20].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-secured PUF: Protecting the Loop PUF by Masking

Tebelmann

Danger

Pehl

2021

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) provide means to generate chip individual keys, especially for low-cost applications such as the Internet of Things (IoT). They are intrinsically robust against reverse engineering, and more cost-effective than non-volatile memory (NVM). For several PUF primitives, countermeasures have been proposed to mitigate side-channel weaknesses. However, most mitigation techniques require substantial design effort and/or complexity overhead, which cannot be tolerated in low-cost IoT scenarios. In this paper, we first analyze side-channel vulnerabilities of the Loop PUF, an area efficient PUF implementation with a configurable delay path based on a single ring oscillator (RO). We provide side-channel analysis (SCA) results from power and electromagnetic measurements. We confirm that oscillation frequencies are easily observable and distinguishable, breaking the security of unprotected Loop PUF implementations. Second, we present a low-cost countermeasure based on temporal masking to thwart SCA that requires only one bit of randomness per PUF response bit. The randomness is extracted from the PUF itself creating a self-secured PUF. The concept is highly effective regarding security, low complexity, and low design constraints making it ideal for applications like IoT. Finally, we discuss trade-offs of side-channel resistance, reliability, and latency as well as the transfer of the countermeasure to other RO-based PUFs.

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“…3. In [18], even the number of oscillations of a TERO were estimated by analyzing the side-channel information. As shown in Fig.…”

Section: Output Bits Estimation Methods By Analyzing Side-channel Lea...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis Against TERO-Based TRNG

Osuka

Fujimoto

Kawamura

et al. 2022

IEEE Trans. Electromagn. Compat.

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True random number generators (TRNGs) based on ring oscillators are employed in many devices because they can be constructed with logic gates only. Random numbers generated by TRNGs are used for various cryptographic systems as session keys, nonces, and masks. The randomness of a TRNG is characterized by uniformity, nonreproducibility, and unpredictability. Moreover, the quality of random numbers affects cryptographic systems. In particular, degradation of the unpredictability can reduce the security of the cryptographic system because random numbers can be easily estimated. Side-channel attacks, which exploit additional information leaked from a cryptographic module to reveal secret information, are well known. If some additional information reflecting the output bit can be measured from electromagnetic (EM) emission as a side-channel leakage against a TRNG, the unpredictability of the TRNG may decrease. Accordingly, this article introduces the leakage model that reflects an output bit generated by a transition effect ring oscillator (TERO) based TRNG, and an attack that estimates random number bits by measuring EM emission from an integrated circuit against TERO-based TRNG.We propose a leakage model against a TERO-based TRNG and demonstrate that the output bits of the TRNG can be estimated by analyzing the radiated emissions. We also consider a countermeasure against the proposed attack.Index Terms-Electromagnetic (EM) information leakage, sidechannel analysis, true random number generator. I. INTRODUCTIONT RUE random number generators (TRNGs) generate random numbers based on a random physical phenomenon called an entropy source. Random numbers generated by TRNGs are used for various cryptographic systems as session keys, nonces, initialization vectors, and masks. The security of these applications relies on the uniformity and unpredictability of the

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Side-Channel Analysis of the TERO PUF

Cited by 17 publications

References 23 publications

Quantum Physical Unclonable Functions: Possibilities and Impossibilities

Quantum Physical Unclonable Functions: Possibilities and Impossibilities

Self-secured PUF: Protecting the Loop PUF by Masking

Electromagnetic Side-Channel Analysis Against TERO-Based TRNG

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