Side-payments versus security cards: domestic bargaining tactics in international economic negotiations

Friman, H. Richard

doi:10.1017/s0020818300028009

Cited by 36 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…This fits the concessions that the Danes received in the renegotiation over the Treaty in December 1992. Empirical work to corroborate these points are beyond the scope of this article, but it is clear that the models of this article suggest some interesting questions for empirical research in this area (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993;Friman, 1993;Lehman and McCoy, 1992;Schoppa, 1993).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 85%

Involuntary defection in two-level games

Iida

1996

Public Choice

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Ratification failures are prevalent in international relations, but due to the assumption of unitary actors in international relations theory, theoretical analysis has been underdeveloped. In formalizing Putnam's metaphor of two-level games, this article shows that incomplete information about the preferences of domestic actors is crucial for understanding ratification failures. Furthermore, institutional mechanisms affect bargaining outcomes through their impact on information revelation. In particular, it is found that two-sided constraints lead to relatively equitable bargaining outcomes and that renegotiation and pre-negotiation poll-taking can induce strategic voting by domestic constituents, thereby exacerbating domestic constraints.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 85%

Involuntary defection in two-level games

Iida

1996

Public Choice

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“…In the electoral sphere, economic groups may influence election results by financing campaigns of candidates with whom they are politically aligned. This means that, even before election, candidates rely on the funds raised to finance their According to Friman (1993), this is required to "combine emotional appeals to patriotic duty and self-sacrifice with arguments that incorporate widely held beliefs on the nature of basic challenges to those core values" (FRIMAN, 1993, p. 392 Fordham and McKeown (2003), the advantage of a geographic concentration is the cohesion and coordination of economic group strategies, whereas the disadvantage lays Such thematic diversity around corn and ethanol production indicates NCGA coordinates a national supply chain of significant economic relevance. In this sense, the appeal to seek new energy matrixes makes the ethanol issue critical for specific interests of the sector to be consensually seen as a U.S. national strategic interest.…”

Section: Us Domestic Policy Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

U.S. International Agricultural Trade Policy: Interests, Institutions and Information in the Corn Supply Chain

Thomaz

Oliveira

2016

Bras. Political Sci. Rev.

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The purpose of this article is to analyze the U.S. international agricultural trade policy by focusing on instruments and institutional arrangements. Policy decision-making is analyzed by means of three variables: 1) how interests are mobilized; 2) how information is disseminated; and 3) how spaces are occupied in deliberation arenas. The study refers to the corn sector and observes how the National Corn Growers Association operated to ensure subsidies and incentives for this supply chain along the elaboration of the 2002 and 2008 Farm Bills, as well as from other laws pertaining to agricultural and energy incentives. This paper provides evidences in favor of four arguments: first, empirical studies on the formulation and implementation of foreign trade policy, especially when it comes to agricultural issues, would greatly benefit with a greater attention on understanding the role domestic actors play in the decision-making processes; second, interest groups play a key role in this decision-making process; third, they provide the rationale for the formulation and implementation of the U.S. international agricultural trade policy; and, fourth, when the economic sector coordinates complex and relevant supply chains in the U.S. economy, it is hardly possible to revert the U.S. protectionist position in the Legislative branch.

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“…On the basis of these previous studies, Putnam [18], Mayer [15], and Lehman and McCoy [14] have developed research on the interactions of negotiation. In his work, "Side-Payments versus Security Cards: Domestic Bargaining Tactics in International Economic Negotiations," Fridman [3] suggested that bargaining tactics with sidepayments and the redefinition of the case can make domestic support and international economic negotiation much easier than it was previously.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%