Signals to Their Parliaments? Governments’ Use of Votes and Policy Statements in the EU Council

Abstract

Does parliamentary oversight of governments’ decisions in the international arena matter? This article finds that it does: governments with strong parliamentary oversight behave differently when negotiating policies at the EU level compared with governments with less powerful parliaments. Where parliaments have formal powers to oversee and restrict their government's positions we see a significantly higher use of opposing votes and formal policy statements by those governments. This behaviour intensifies depending on the governments' standing vis‐à‐vis other political parties at home. When governments are under pressure in their national parliaments they are more likely to go on record and take a stand against the majority in Brussels. These results make it clear that in EU legislative politics, governments not only consider their policy priorities and negotiation tactics with their European counterparts, but also make use of EU decision records to send signals to domestic audiences, including their national parliaments.

National parliamentary control and voting in the Council of the European Union

“…Our results are in line with Hagemann et al. (), who found that the stronger national parliaments are, the more likely governments are to vote ‘No’ or abstain, and issue negative statements. Our findings suggest that the increase in negative statements they observed may be due to an increase in such statements that accompany abstentions and ‘No’ votes.…”

“…19 In addition, interacting Institutional strength with Euroscepticism allows us to control for MS fixed effects and study within-country variation. In this respect, our research again complements Hagemann et al (2019).…”

“…Novak (2013) provides another explanation for why MSs' votes may depend on those of other MSs: the cost of dissent may be smaller if other MSs have already broken the consensus. Hagemann et al (2019) provide evidence that the higher national parliaments' formal powers in EU affairs are, the more likely it is that MSs vote 'No' or abstain, and issue negative statements. We also study the impact of national parliament involvement on MS voting behaviour.…”

“…Hagemann et al. () provide evidence that the higher national parliaments’ formal powers in EU affairs are, the more likely it is that MSs vote ‘No’ or abstain, and issue negative statements. We also study the impact of national parliament involvement on MS voting behaviour.…”

“…16 As a result, they are stable during the period of our analysis. Hagemann et al (2019) also use these scores, but as measures of parliamentary scrutiny. However, formal strength does not necessarily translate to active scrutiny.…”