Signature requirements and citizen initiatives: Quasi-experimental evidence from Germany

Arnold, Félix; Freier, Ronny

doi:10.1007/s11127-014-0189-8

“…The availability of a pre-and post-treatment period together with population size dependent thresholds allows us to combine RD and difference-in-differences methods and to implement a difference-in-discontinuities (diff-in-disc) design (e.g., Grembi et al, 2014;Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2015). 3 Related studies that use the same natural experiment but study different questions are Arnold and Freier (2015), who explore how signature requirements affect direct democratic activity, and Asatryan et al (2014), who study the effect of direct democracy on the level and structure of local taxes. Asatryan and De Witte (2015) also exploit the Bavarian direct democracy reforms, but study its effects on government efficiency.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Direct Democracy and Local Public Finances under Cooperative Federalism

Asatryan

¹

,

Baskaran

²

,

Grigoriadis

³

et al. 2016

Scandinavian J Economics

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Non-technical SummaryA growing literature studies the role of political institutions in shaping fiscal outcomes.One of the most important differences in political institutions of established democracies is whether fiscal and economic decisions are made by elected representatives or through direct voting. Popular influence over policy making brings fiscal policy closer to the electorate's preferences. If representatives prefer more spending than voters, then direct democracy will constrain public budgets. If voters prefer more spending than representatives, then spending will be higher in political jurisdictions that allow for more direct democracy.The public choice tradition argues that elected politicians tend to overspend, overtax and to overborrow due to the interests and influence of bureaucrats or special interest groups. Direct democracy may shift power to voters themselves thus alleviating the principle-agent problems. Direct legislation is one mechanism of the fiscal constitution that allows voters to constrain the Leviathan government.In a federal setting, however, local voters may face particular common-pool disincentives. If the funding of municipalities originates from a "common pool" of country-wide and future taxpayers, voters also welcome overspending on local public goods and services. Voter disincentives may even be larger than those of local politicians. The latter are often constrained by the policies of their countrywide parties. This may result in voters' inaction against constraining the Leviathan or even incentivize them to act as a Leviathan themselves against the taxpayers of other jurisdictions. In this case, direct democracy increases spending.The present paper tries to answer empirically which of the two perspectives has validity for Germany. It is the first analysis of the link between direct democracy and fiscal outcomes for Germany, an archetypal cooperative federation. Hence, Germany offers an intriguing case of comparison against the existing Swiss and US evidence.The starting point of the empirical analysis exploits the variance in the use of voter initiatives at the municipal level in the German State of Bavaria. We have information on all initiatives since the introduction of the right of petitioning for referenda in 1995.Using an selection on observables approach, we find a negative instantaneous correlation between referenda activity and municipal budgets. This turns positive with increasing lags.To address the obvious endog...

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“…Such evidence of a causal negative e↵ect of signature requirements on direct democratic activity is also demonstrated by Arnold and Freier (2015).…”

mentioning

confidence: 71%

Vetoing and Inaugurating Policy Like Others Do: Evidence on Spatial Interactions in Voter Initiatives

Asatryan

¹

,

Havlik

²

,

Streif

³

2015

SSRN Journal

1

0

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Vetoing and Inaugurating Policy Like Others Do:Evidence on spatial interactions in voter initiatives voter-petitions across over 12,000 German municipalities in 2002-09, we find that a jurisdiction's probability of hosting a petition is positively driven by the neighbors' direct democratic activity. These e↵ects are persistent, and are stronger for more visible instruments of direct democracy. The interactions are also mostly driven by petitions in same or similiar policy areas, and are stronger in towns with relatively more per capita newspapers.

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“…11 Similar strategies to the one used in this paper have been used by Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2012), Grembi et al (2012), Lemieux and Milligan (2008) and Pettersson-Lidbom (2012). More generally, population thresholds have been widely used in recent years as a way to get a credible estimation of causal effects (Arnold and Freier, 2013;Bordignon et al, 2013;Brollo et al, 2009;Campa, 2012;Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2012;Egger and Koethenbuerger, 2010;Eggers, 2013;Ferraz and Finan, 2009;Fujiwara, 2011;Fujiwara, 2015;Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013;Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom, 2014;Hirota and Yunoue, 2013;Litschig and Morrison, 2013;Petterson-Lidbom, 2006). 12 The discontinuity is significant using McCrary's (2008) test in a pooled cross section of all the municipality-years, but not if each election-year is considered separately.…”

Section: Empirical Strategymentioning

confidence: 93%

The Effect of Electoral Systems on Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Sanz¹

2015

PSRM

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I exploit the unique institutional framework of Spanish local elections, where municipalities follow different electoral systems depending on their population size, as mandated by a national law. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare turnout under closed-list proportional representation and under an open-list, plurality-at-large system where voters can vote for individual candidates from the same or different party lists. I fi nd that the openlist system increases turnout by between one and two percentage points. The results suggest that open-list systems, which introduce competition both across and within parties, are conducive to greater voter turnout. Keywords: voter turnout, electoral system, open list, regression discontinuity. JEL classifi cation: D72. ResumenEn este artículo se explota el marco institucional de las elecciones municipales españolas, en las que se utilizan distintos sistemas electorales dependiendo del número de habitantes del municipio, según lo establecido por la Ley. Mediante una regresión discontinua, se compara la participación en un sistema de representación proporcional y listas cerradas con otro de listas abiertas, en el que los votantes pueden votar por candidatos individuales de la misma o diferentes listas. Se encuentra que el sistema de listas abiertas incrementa la participación electoral entre uno y dos puntos porcentuales. Los resultados sugieren que los sistemas de listas abiertas, que introducen competencia tanto entre como dentro de los partidos, conducen a más participación electoral.Palabras clave: participación electoral, sistema electoral, listas abiertas, regresión discontinua. Códigos JEL: D72. BANCO DE ESPAÑA 7 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1623

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Signature requirements and citizen initiatives: Quasi-experimental evidence from Germany

Cited by 35 publications

References 31 publications

Direct Democracy and Local Public Finances under Cooperative Federalism

Direct Democracy and Local Public Finances under Cooperative Federalism

Vetoing and Inaugurating Policy Like Others Do: Evidence on Spatial Interactions in Voter Initiatives

The Effect of Electoral Systems on Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

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