Silencing the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Challenges of the Four-Day War

Abstract

The Four-Day War of 2016 once again exposed the danger that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict poses in the Caucasus. However, despite its military scale and human losses, Russia has raised only general statements from other co-chairs of the osce (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Minsk Group, from the United States and France, and from other international actors such as the United Nations Security Council. In an attempt to stimulate debate about this lack of engagement, this paper claims that the external actors involved aim to cast silence over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict beyond the region. While this approach may serve to remove the political impact of the conflict from the international arena, it unwittingly also enhances the aggressiveness of both Armenia and Azerbaijan in the regional arena. The main aim of this paper is, then, to explain why the conflict is being silenced, how this is made possible and what the regional effects of this approach are. By drawing on the Four-Day War of 2016, the paper intends to show how the recent violence has challenged the silencing of external actors.

The impact of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020 on the perception of combat drones

“…During the Four-Day War, about 200 people were killed on both sides. The Azerbaijani side achieved certain minimal territorial gains, but a far more important consequence of the Four-Day War is the awareness of Azerbaijan that they can regain the areas occupied by the Armenians by military means (Bayramov, 2016). During the conflict, Azerbaijan successfully used several types of combat unmanned aerial vehicles such as "IAI Harop" (kamikaze UCAV), "ThunderB", "Orbiter 2M", "Aerostar", "Hermes 450" and "Heron-1".…”

Multiple borders of Nagorno-Karabakh

“…A number of authors compare the case of Nagorno-Karabakh with other post-Soviet conflicts. The significance of the Kosovo precedent for de facto state recognition is considered (Ozan 2008;Bayramov 2016;Tokarev 2017;Babayev et al 2020). Many authors analyze domestic political causes and consequences of the outbreak of hostilities between Artsakh and Azerbaijan in April of 2016 -the so-called Four-Day War and the factors contributing to its quick end thanks to the efforts of Russia and other countries of the Minsk Group.…”

“…In this context, they seek an explanation for the lack of progress in resolving the conflict. Some see such interests in the lack of open communication on the part of the intermediary countries that stems for their interest in maintaining relations with both sides (Bayramov 2016;Branch 2018). Others are trying to connect the Karabakh conflict to the lack of universally recognized criteria for the international legitimization of new states emphasizing that its only difference from other states is non-recognition (Berg et al 2018;Caspersen 2012Caspersen , 2015Iskandaryan 2019).…”

Great game visions and the reality of cooperation around post-Soviet transnational infrastructure projects in the Caspian Sea region

“…In the same vein, the project was expected to trigger rivalry and even war in the region following its construction (e.g. in Nagorno-Karabakh) (Bayramov 2016;Cohen 2002;Kim and Eom 2008). This understanding of the oil pipeline offers, however, the misleading impression that if there are natural resources, there will always be conflict and rivalry (Bayramov 2018;Klare 2001).…”