Simple and complex gift exchange in the laboratory

Heijden, E.C.M. van der; Nelissen, J.H.M.; Potters, Jan; Verbon, H.A.A.

doi:10.1093/ei/39.2.280

Cited by 16 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…On the other hand, with leaders contributing 27% of the time and followers conditioning their contribution on that of the leaders, follower contributions are smaller in the sequential game. Van der Heijden et al (2001) find a similar effect in a gift exchange experiment. 24 Depending on how one splits the ties the two-sided p-value ranges from 0.4857 to 0.8857.…”

Section: Full Informationmentioning

confidence: 59%

Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study

2007

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We report experimental results on the effect of leadership in a voluntary contribution game. Consistent with recent theories we find that leading-by-example increases contributions and earnings in an environment where a leader has private information about the returns from contributing (Hermalin in Am Econ Rev 88:1188-1206, 1998; Vesterlund in J Public Econ 87: 2003). In contrast the ability to lead-by-example has no effect on total contributions and earnings when such returns are commonly known. In our environment the success of leadership therefore appears to be driven by signaling rather than by nonpecuniary factors such as reciprocity.

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Section: Full Informationmentioning

confidence: 59%

Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study

2007

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“…At the same time they believe support to be fairer than grants. 11 Van der Heijden, Nelissen, Potters and Verbon (2001) drew a similar conclusion based on a gift exchange experiment in which there were different cooperative outcomes. versa; see e.g.…”

Section: Concluding Discussionmentioning

confidence: 84%

Are Family Transfers Crowded Out by Public Transfers?

Güth¹,

Offerman

Potters

et al. 2002

Scandinavian J Economics

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We give an account of an overlapping-generations experiment with multiple families in which voluntary transfers can take the form of support to the elderly or grants to children. Support to the old is a purely intergenerational (intra-family) transfer, whereas grants to children also involve an element of intra-generational (inter-family) redistribution through a compulsory pension system. Our data show that higher compulsory inter-family transfers lead subjects to place relatively more emphasis on support instead of grants: grants are crowded out, but support is not significantly affected. The efficiency of voluntary transfers increases, however. Furthermore, if subjects give transfers, they do not use tokens of direct reciprocity; evidence of indirect reciprocity in transfer behavior can only be obtained for the case where compulsory transfers are high.

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“…Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999a) and -2 -Recent literature in experimental economics (e.g. Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993;Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995, Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997, Charness 1998, Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner 2000, Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 2000, Clark and Sefton 2001, Van der Heijden, Nelissen, Potters, and Verbon 2001, Irlenbusch and Sliwka 2003 has pointed out that the assumption that economic agents are guided by narrow self-interest and maximisation of monetary payoffs has to be rejected in many cases. Fairness and reciprocity play an important role in explaining human behaviour.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Career concerns in a simple experimental labour market

Irlenbusch

Sliwka

2006

European Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour MarketBernd Irlenbusch Dirk Sliwka The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent, nonprofit limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. The current research program deals with (1) mobility and flexibility of labor, (2) internationalization of labor markets, (3) welfare state and labor market, (4) labor markets in transition countries, (5) the future of labor, (6) evaluation of labor market policies and projects and (7) general labor economics. D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available on the IZA website (www.iza.org) or directly from the author. ABSTRACT Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market *We experimentally investigate a simple version of Holmström's career concerns model in which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods. Profits of firms are determined by agents' unknown ability and the effort they choose. Before making second-period wage offers firms are informed about first-period profits. In a different treatment firms additionally learn the abilities of agents. Theory suggests high first-period equilibrium effort in the hidden ability treatment but no effort elsewhere. However, we find that effort is significantly higher in the revealed ability treatment and therefore conclude that transparency does not weaken, but strengthen career concerns incentives.JEL Classification: C72, C91, J33

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Simple and complex gift exchange in the laboratory

Cited by 16 publications

References 12 publications

Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study

Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study

Are Family Transfers Crowded Out by Public Transfers?

Career concerns in a simple experimental labour market

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