2004
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-24707-4_76
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Simple and Efficient Group Key Agreement Based on Factoring

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Cited by 10 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…The proposed work continues the line of research on the two-server paradigm in (Wen et al, 2005;Nam et al, 2004), extend the model by imposing different levels of trust upon the two servers and adopt a very different method at the technical level in the protocol design. As a result, we propose a practical two-server password authentication and key exchange system that is secure against offline dictionary attacks by servers when they are controlled by adversaries.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 92%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The proposed work continues the line of research on the two-server paradigm in (Wen et al, 2005;Nam et al, 2004), extend the model by imposing different levels of trust upon the two servers and adopt a very different method at the technical level in the protocol design. As a result, we propose a practical two-server password authentication and key exchange system that is secure against offline dictionary attacks by servers when they are controlled by adversaries.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…In classical cryptography, three-party key distribution protocols (Wen et al, 2005;Nam et al, 2004) utilize challenge response mechanisms (Stallings, 1998) or timestamps (Shirey, 2000) to prevent replay attacks (Bennett and Brassard, 1984), However, challenge response mechanisms require at least two communication rounds (Gottesman and Lo, 2003) between the TC and participants and the timestamp approach needs the assumption of clock synchronization which is not practical in distributed systems (due to the unpredictable nature of network delays and potential hostile attacks) (Bennett, 1992). Furthermore, classical cryptography cannot detect the existence of passive attacks (Hwang et al, 2007) such as eavesdropping.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…if timeout period of sender node is x then timeout period of receiver node will be (x-m), where m will be critical factor. This factor [16] helps us to control the max no of hops a message can traverse to reach destination. Now the scheme is as follows-A node can do either of three activities -message generate, message forward, message receive.…”
Section: Description Of the Schemementioning
confidence: 99%
“…if timeout period of sender node is x then timeout period of receiver node will be x/m, where m will be critical factor. This factor [23] signifies maximum no of failure a node can endure without causing congestion in the network.…”
Section: Description Of the Schemementioning
confidence: 99%