2020
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2007.14274
|View full text |Cite
Preprint
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints

Alexandros A. Voudouris

Abstract: We study the efficiency of simple combinatorial auctions for the allocation of a set of items to a set of agents, with private subadditive valuation functions and budget constraints. e class we consider includes all auctions that allocate each item independently to the agent that submits the highest bid for it, and requests a payment that depends on the bids of all agents only for this item. Two well-known examples of this class are the simultaneous first and second price auctions. We focus on the pure equilib… Show more

Help me understand this report
View published versions

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

0
0
0

Publication Types

Select...

Relationship

0
0

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 0 publications
references
References 14 publications
0
0
0
Order By: Relevance

No citations

Set email alert for when this publication receives citations?