Simple minds: a qualified defence of associative learning

Abstract

Using cooperation in chimpanzees as a case study, this article argues that research on animal minds needs to steer a course between 'association-blindness'-the failure to consider associative learning as a candidate explanation for complex behaviour-and 'simple-mindedness'-the assumption that associative explanations trump more cognitive hypotheses. Association-blindness is challenged by the evidence that associative learning occurs in a wide range of taxa and functional contexts, and is a major force guiding the development of complex human behaviour. Furthermore, contrary to a common view, association-blindness is not entailed by the rejection of behaviourism. Simplemindedness is founded on Morgan's canon, a methodological principle recommending 'lower' over 'higher' explanations for animal behaviour. Studies in the history and philosophy of science show that Morgan failed to offer an adequate justification for his canon, and subsequent attempts to justify the canon using evolutionary arguments and appeals to simplicity have not been successful. The weaknesses of association-blindness and simple-mindedness imply that there are no shortcuts to finding out about animal minds. To decide between associative and yet more cognitive explanations for animal behaviour, we have to spell them out in sufficient detail to allow differential predictions, and to test these predictions through observation and experiment.

‘Theory of mind’ in animals: ways to make progress

“…A second reason to be skeptical of results that seem to demonstrate that animals can attribute mental states is that they may come from experiments that are 'insufficiently controlled' (Bolhuis and Wynne 2009;Shettleworth 2010a;Heyes 2012). Although comparative researchers studying 'theory of mind' often take care to exclude as many alternative hypotheses as possible, relevant control conditions may also be overlooked.…”

“…Although their own follow-up experiments showed this hypothesis to be false-subordinate chimpanzees reacted differently to food pieces fully and partially concealed from a dominant, despite the fact that they could eat by a barrier in both cases (Karin-D'Arcy and Povinelli 2002)-it was not initially discussed as a possible alternative explanation. This indicates that many other results may also come from insufficiently controlled experiments, as skeptics claim (Bolhuis and Wynne 2009;Shettleworth 2010a;Heyes 2012). …”

“…First, it is not clear that 'mind reading' is actually a 'simpler' explanation than 'behavior reading', as many authors have argued (for an overview, see Heyes 2012). It is certainly more complex in the sense of being cognitively more complex, and it is not necessarily less complex in the sense of requiring less behavioral rules or less learning (Povinelli and Vonk 2004).…”

“…Heyes (2012), for instance, argues that part of the problem is that associative learning-the 'alternative theory' to 'more cognitive' explanations, in most cases-is a challenging subject to get into. Its long history and technical vocabulary make it difficult for nonspecialists to absorb.…”

“…The first is that results that seem to indicate 'theory of mind' come from experiments that are of the wrong kind, that cannot differentiate between 'mind readers' and 'behavior readers' (Lurz 2011;Penn and Povinelli 2007). The second is that results come from experiments that are insufficiently controlled, in the sense that they do not explicitly test for alternative, 'less mentalistic' explanations (Bolhuis and Wynne 2009;Heyes 2012). The third is that certain results are seen as evidence of 'theory of mind' because our own biases favor that interpretation (Shettleworth 2010a;Barrett 2010;Bolhuis and Wynne 2009).…”