Simulating combinatorial auctions with dominance requirement and loll bids through automated agents

Avenali, Alessandro; Bassanini, Anna

doi:10.1016/j.dss.2006.09.008

Cited by 13 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Kim presented an agentbased simulation model to estimate the effects of auction parameters on the auction outcomes, and to find an optimal infrastructure [7]. Combinatorial auction was studied in Avenali's paper [5].…”

Section: Review Of the Related Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulating the (S, s)-Controlled Stochastic System in Different Supply Chains by a Multi-Agent System

Sheng²

2008

2008 International Conference on Computer Science and Information Technology

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The lead-time for the retailer's inventory system may be changed with different suppliers in china's low technology industries. A multi-agent simulation system is proposed to simulate this category of dynamic supply chain. In the simulation system, the retailer's stock was controlled by (S, s) policy, and then four categories of supply chain scenarios were suggested. Four propositions were achieved by the simulation system. With the decrease of s, the retailer's profit has different tendency under the four scenarios. Optimal (nearoptimal) s, correspond to maximum profits, shows significant difference in the four scenarios. The results of the paper demonstrate that s can be significantly changed and financial benefits can be achieved while the retailer cooperates with different suppliers under the four supply chains

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Section: Review Of the Related Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulating the (S, s)-Controlled Stochastic System in Different Supply Chains by a Multi-Agent System

Sheng²

2008

2008 International Conference on Computer Science and Information Technology

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“…Other prior research has simulated bidding behaviour in auctions (Stone et al, 2003;Reeves et al, 2005;Avenali and Bassanini, 2007). However, these works are aimed at assessing particular tools or techniques and not at predicting results of real auctions.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The importance of the size of the digital dividend when digital dividend spectrum is auctioned

Gómez-Barroso

Mochón

Sáez

et al. 2011

IJMC

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This paper simulates a 'service-neutral' digital dividend auction, considering three different amounts of spectrum (48 MHz, 80 MHz and 120 MHz). For this, an efficient simulator for combinatorial first-price sealed bid auctions has been implemented. The results show rather coherently that the price per lot is higher the smaller the amount of spectrum auctioned and that companies from the mobile environment will most probably emerge as main winners from these digital dividend auctions. These research findings are particularly important as the sharing out of the digital dividend represents a unique opportunity for putting a precious amount of radio electric spectrum at the disposal of other services, particularly for the development of new generations of mobile communications.Keywords: digital dividend; spectrum auctions; spectrum management; digital switchover; combinatorial auctions; UHF band; mobile communication; television; digital broadcasting; mobile multimedia.Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Gómez-Barroso, J.L., Mochón, A., Sáez, Y. and Feijóo, C. (2011) Claudio Feijóo is a Professor at Universidad Politécnica de Madrid where he researches on the future socio-economic impact of emerging information society technologies. He has just come back from a highly rewarding two years' visiting research at the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies of the European Commission. Since 1993, he has been involved in telecommunications and information society development from the academia, the practical implementation and the public administration perspectives. He lectures regularly on these matters and has published more than 50 peer-reviewed papers in academic journals and books.

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“…Furthermore, should it be possible to coordinate themselves, there remains the problem that each bidder of the group will be encouraged to engage in non-virtuous behaviors, waiting for the others to bid more to beat the current bid (free-rider problem; see Milgrom, 2000). Multiple auction mechanisms have been proposed in the literature to deal with these problems (specially the threshold one), such as for instance formats applying the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) rule, iterative ascending schemes storing submitted bids, auctions making use of proxy agents; see for example Ausubel (2004), Ausubel and Milgrom (2002), Avenali and Bassanini (2007), AUSM procedure by Banks et al (1989), two stage PAUSE format by Kelly and Steinberg (2000), iBundle scheme by Parkes (1999), Varian and MacKie-Mason (1995). Moreover, in combinatorial auctions coordination among players in terms of submitted bids can have completely different effects on auctions performances; in fact, it can help overcoming the threshold problem, but it can also be used by players to win specific items by offering very low bids.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulating combinatorial auctions with dominance requirement and loll bids through automated agents

Cited by 13 publications

References 28 publications

Simulating the (S, s)-Controlled Stochastic System in Different Supply Chains by a Multi-Agent System

Simulating the (S, s)-Controlled Stochastic System in Different Supply Chains by a Multi-Agent System

The importance of the size of the digital dividend when digital dividend spectrum is auctioned

Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: The threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule

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