Singer's Philosophy of Experimentalism

Krikorian, Y. H.

doi:10.1086/287844

Cited by 4 publications

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“…Some of the figures we have already discussed, namely Hook and Ratner, combined work on science-informed metaphysics of the speculative variety with a strong Deweyan bent (see, e.g., Hook 1927 andRatner 1939). Others working in the Deweyan tradition, including Singer Jr. and his student Churchman, developed philosophies of science that aimed to be scientific and that were value-laden (see Krikorian 1962 on Singer Jr.'s views and, e.g., Churchman 1961 on his own views). Such Deweyan philosophers were still within the speculative tradition; while they do not engage in speculative metaphysics, they viewed philosophy as aiming to make substantive, empirical claims about reality that go beyond those of science.…”

Section: American Philosophy Of Science (1900-1950)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rise of Logical Empiricist Philosophy of Science and the Fate of Speculative Philosophy of Science

Katzav¹,

Vaesen²

2022

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History

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This paper contributes to explaining the rise of logical empiricism in mid-twentieth century (North) America and to a better understanding of American philosophy of science before the dominance of logical empiricism. We show that, contrary to a number of existing histories, philosophy of science was already a distinct subfield of philosophy, one with its own approaches and issues, even before logical empiricists arrived in America. It was a form of speculative philosophy with a concern for speculative metaphysics, normative issues relating to science and society and issues which later were associated with logical empiricist philosophy of science, issues such as confirmation, scientific explanation, reductionism and laws of nature. Further, philosophy of science was not primarily pragmatist in orientation. We also show, with the help of our historical characterization, that a recent account of the emergence of analytic philosophy applies to the rise of logical empiricism. It has been argued that the emergence of American analytic philosophy is partly explained by analytic philosophers' use of key institutions, including of journals, to marginalize speculative philosophy and promote analytic philosophy. We argue that this use of institutions included the marginalization of speculative and value-laden philosophy of science and the promotion of logical empiricism.Acknowledgements: we would like to thank the paper's anonymous reviewers for their useful comments.

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Section: American Philosophy Of Science (1900-1950)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rise of Logical Empiricist Philosophy of Science and the Fate of Speculative Philosophy of Science

Katzav¹,

Vaesen²

2022

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History

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Solipsism: An Essay in Psychological Philosophy

Mitroff¹

1971

Philos. of Sci.

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The thesis of this paper is that in dealing with problems of “mind,” the philosopher of mind needs to be as well grounded in his relevant sciences (e.g. psychology, anthropology) as the philosopher of the physical sciences needs to be grounded in his relevant sciences (e.g. physics). The thesis of this paper is also that the psychological analysis of solipsism and the philosophical analysis are not independent (or at least not independent in all of their aspects), and that therefore the psychological analysis sheds light on the philosophical, and vice versa. It is argued that solipsism is untenable on at least two grounds: because (1) there are no such physical phenomena as acts of “immediate perception,” and because (2), that there can be no such thing as an “individual mind” without some form of a “group mind.”

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Systems, Inquiry, and the Meanings of Falsification

Mitroff

1973

Philos. of Sci.

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The purpose of this paper is to show that there are as many formulations of the process of falsification as there are archetypal, philosophical systems of inquiry. This paper explores several systems of inquiry which are based on Churchman's reading of the history of Western epistemology. It is argued that (1) the falsification of scientific theories can never be a purely formal process although it is perpetually open to formal exploration ; (2) that contrary to current belief, falsification can never be more certain than confirmation because falsification involves judgments which are no more certain than those involved in confirmation. The supposed asymmetry between confirmation and falsification is severely challenged. Finally, a Feyerabendian and a Hegelian notion of falsification are explicitly developed and contrasted.

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Singer's Philosophy of Experimentalism

Cited by 4 publications

References 0 publications

The Rise of Logical Empiricist Philosophy of Science and the Fate of Speculative Philosophy of Science

The Rise of Logical Empiricist Philosophy of Science and the Fate of Speculative Philosophy of Science

Solipsism: An Essay in Psychological Philosophy

Systems, Inquiry, and the Meanings of Falsification

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