2006
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0098-y
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

2
26
0

Year Published

2010
2010
2017
2017

Publication Types

Select...
4
2

Relationship

0
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 37 publications
(28 citation statements)
references
References 22 publications
2
26
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Therefore, in that case the result stated in Proposition 2 resembles Lemma 4 in Saporiti and Tohmé (2006), which shows that a single crossing profile, once restricted to the set of ideal points, always satisfies single peakedness.…”
Section: Proposition 2 a Preference Profile Is Top Monotonic On A Resupporting
confidence: 55%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Therefore, in that case the result stated in Proposition 2 resembles Lemma 4 in Saporiti and Tohmé (2006), which shows that a single crossing profile, once restricted to the set of ideal points, always satisfies single peakedness.…”
Section: Proposition 2 a Preference Profile Is Top Monotonic On A Resupporting
confidence: 55%
“…Single crossing and order restriction have been proven to be equivalent (Lemma 2 in Saporiti and Tohmé (2006) and Theorem 3 in Gans and Smart (1996) for the case where the order over the set of alternatives and the order over the set of voters are fixed). We shall use one or the other in our reasonings and comparisons with other conditions, depending on which version is more amenable to treatment in each case.…”
Section: Definitionmentioning
confidence: 95%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The first example is due to Saporiti and Tohmé (2006) and shows a profile that is single-peaked but fails to be single-crossing. The other two examples introduce two principal actors of this paper.…”
Section: Some Profiles That Are Not Single-crossingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, single-crossing preferences play a role in the areas of income redistribution (Meltzer and Richard 1981), coalition formation (Demange 1994;Kung 2006), local public goods and stratification (Westhoff 1977;Epple and Platt 1998), and in the choice of constitutional voting rules (Barberà and Jackson 2004). Saporiti and Tohmé (2006) study single-crossing preferences in the context of strategic voting and the median choice rule, and Saporiti (2009) investigates them in the context of strategy proof social choice functions. Barberà and Moreno (2011) develop the concept of top monotonicity as a common generalization of singlepeakedness and single-crossingness (and of several other domain restrictions).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%