Single Transferrable Vote: An Example of a Perverse Social Choice Function

Doron, Gideon; Kronick, Richard

doi:10.2307/2110496

Cited by 115 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…This confirms once again the disproportional effects of the system, with hardly predictable consequences (Doron, 1977). This time, the losers benefit.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 59%

European parliament elections 1979

1982

Electoral Studies

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CISE -Centro Italiano Studi ElettoraliDirected by Roberto D'Alimonte, the CISE -Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali (Italian Centre for Electoral Studies) is an inter-university research center established jointly by the LUISS Guido Carli University of Rome and the University of Florence. Its activity focuses on the study of elections and their institutional framework. The CISE carries out a range of research activities with different points of view on the electoral process: from the analysis of individual voting behavior (investigated through an independent, regular series of CATI surveys) to analyses of election results based on aggregate data (also including the study of vote shifts and of electoral geography), to research on electoral systems and their related legislation. The CISE research activity is also carried out through partnerships with other Italian and international scholars, as well as with national and international research centers and research programmes. The activities of the CISE, systematically documented on the website at http://cise.luiss.it/, are supported by Eni. The European Parliament Elections of 2014Edited by Lorenzo De Sio Vincenzo Emanuele Nicola Maggini Introduction 1 Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele and Nicola MagginiThis book is dedicated to the European Parliament (EP) elections of 22-25 May 2014. Elections that were expected to be the first truly European elections, rather than a collection of second-order elections, focused on national issues as had happened in all previous elections Hix and Marsh, 2011).There were good reasons for such expectations. After 2008, the financial and sovereign debt crisis has impacted Europe, with important, and sometimes dramatic, consequences in economic, social, and political terms. Indeed, the crisis did not have an immediate impact, in terms of economic policies that would affect the everyday life of ordinary people. As a result, the 2009 EP elections-held almost nine months after the Lehman Brothers default-did not show particularly clear effects of the crisis (De Sio and Legnante, 2010). But in subsequent years, the reaction to the crisis has seen the emergence of the European Union, its institutions, and other international institutions as key players in terms of economic policy of the Euro member states. Several of the states that were most impacted by the sovereign debt crisis had to negotiate bailout deals with the "Troika" committee (European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund) that strongly limited, if not temporarily cancelled, their economic policy sovereignty. Also, most other eurozone countries had to take economic measures with a strong impact on the everyday life of ordinary people.It is in this context that according to many observers, the European Parliament elections of 2014 would become much more relevant than in the past-a first, key test to assess the response of European citizens to the austerity policies decided in Brussels. With the expected consequence of citizens becoming aware that w...

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“…This confirms once again the disproportional effects of the system, with hardly predictable consequences (Doron, 1977). This time, the losers benefit.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 59%

European parliament elections 1979

1982

Electoral Studies

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“…• A byproduct of our analysis is to show that even a single voter in an STV election can change a candidate from winner to loser by moving him up in his preferences, which slightly strengthens the example of [9]. In the contrived election of Theorem 1, if the manipulative voter constructs an effective preference then his favored candidate c will win; but if the voter moves c to the top of his preferences then c will lose.…”

Section: Non-monotonicitymentioning

confidence: 67%

“…Doron and Kronick have shown that STV is non-monotonic: there exist elections for which a candidate can change from an STV winner to a loser simply as a result of gaining support [9]. We show that it is NP-complete to recognize when non-monotonicity occurs in STV elections.…”

Section: Non-monotonicitymentioning

confidence: 87%

“…Note that we are not arguing for the adoption of STV-it has troubling faults documented elsewhere [6,9,12,17,21]-rather we are contributing to the argument begun by [4,5] that computational properties ought to be among the criteria by which a prospective voting scheme is evaluated. In this regard STV differs in an interesting and possibly helpful way from other common voting schemes.…”

mentioning

confidence: 89%

“…Subsequent analysis has tempered this enthusiasm somewhat, since STV, like any voting system, must be imperfect. Most troubling of its weaknesses is that it is possible for a candidate to change from a winner to a loser as a result of gaining more support [9]. Nevertheless, STV has much to commend it, most notably its tendency to guarantee proportional representation.…”

Section: Single Transferable Votementioning

confidence: 99%

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Single transferable vote resists strategic voting

1991

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We give evidence that Single Tranferable Vote (STV) is computationally resistant to manipulation: It is NP-complete to determine whether there exists a (possibly insincere) preference that will elect a favored candidate, even in an election for a single seat. Thus strategic voting under STV is qualitatively more difficult than under other commonly-used voting schemes. Furthermore, this resistance to manipulation is inherent to STV and does not depend on hopeful extraneous assumptions like the presumed difficulty of learning the preferences of the other voters.We also prove that it is NP-complete to recognize when an STV election violates monotonicity. This suggests that non-monotonicity in STV elections might be perceived as less threatening since it is in effect "hidden" and hard to exploit for strategic advantage.

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An investigation into the relative manipulability of four voting systems

Chamberlin

1985

Syst. Res.

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Single Transferrable Vote: An Example of a Perverse Social Choice Function

Cited by 115 publications

References 8 publications

European parliament elections 1979

European parliament elections 1979

Single transferable vote resists strategic voting

An investigation into the relative manipulability of four voting systems

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