Single-Vehicle Transportation Security System of Radioactive Materials Based on Group Relationship to Prevent Loss and Theft

Abstract

For loss and theft in the transport of radioactive materials by a single vehicle, this article summarizes the characteristics of “illegal movement” and establishes a security system that senses its inter-relationship and responds though the group network relationship. The security system reminds the vehicle crew through on-site response and linkage response. A failure detection method for on-site response is proposed, that is, the push model is used first, and when the measurement results are suspected, the pull model is used to further confirm the failure. The failure detection for linkage response adopts the push model. According to the different security requirements of the basic and enhanced transportation, the principle of setting the timeout threshold in the failure detection algorithm is proposed. In the enhanced type, the value is smaller, otherwise the value is larger. A specific timeout threshold quantification scheme is proposed. Experiments show that the method proposed in this article is effective.

Detecting Unauthorized Movement of Radioactive Material Packages in Transport with an Adam-Optimized BP Neural Network Model

“…Meanwhile, cameras may not be applicable on ships to monitor radioactive materials due to confdentiality and privacy requirements. To address these challenges, Zeng et al [20,21] developed a method to detect unauthorized movements by installing a wireless node on radioactive items within the cargo package. In this context, Zeng et al [20] established a network comprising numerous wireless nodes on the packages.…”

“…To address these challenges, Zeng et al [20,21] developed a method to detect unauthorized movements by installing a wireless node on radioactive items within the cargo package. In this context, Zeng et al [20] established a network comprising numerous wireless nodes on the packages. In this approach, any illegal movement of containers can be detected by monitoring the real-time connection status between the detecting node and its adjacent nodes.…”

Detection of Illegal Movement in Radioactive Material Transportation Security Systems

“…Considering the error, it can be detected only by a certain distance beyond the side wall of the carriage. At this time, there is still a considerable distance from the communication failure, so the detection distance is shorter than the article [7], and the alarm time is shorter.…”

“…is article and article [7] both focus on the loss and theft of radioactive materials during transportation. e detection distance of the two follows the order from far to near, and the detection time is from long to short (if the same communication method is used).…”

“…e detection distance of the two follows the order from far to near, and the detection time is from long to short (if the same communication method is used). Based on the illegal movement detection method of failure detection [7], when the individual self-security security device installed on the radioactive material container is fixedly connected to the container itself, it can be considered that the movement of the individual self-security security device is the movement of the radioactive material (specific fixed connection technology not discussed here). When the radioactive material and the transportation compartment can maintain a communication link, regardless of the damage of the device itself, the distance between the two is not far.…”