Single Versus Multiple Randomization in Matching Mechanisms

Schmelzer, André

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2777405

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…A substantial fraction of subjects (40%) prefers one assignment mechanism over the other, while the majority is indifferent. This evidence is in line with the previous finding that preferences over mechanisms which yield identical expected outcomes can differ systematically (Schmelzer, 2016). Further, the preference for SP-RSD is negatively related to dominant strategy play.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 91%

Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms

Schmelzer

2018

jMID

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This paper seeks to identify which algorithm to employ in a situation where goods are distributed to individuals without using money, while treating everyone equally and respecting each individual's preferences. I compare two stochastic assignment mechanisms: Random serial dictatorship (RSD) and top trading cycles with random endowments (TTC). In standard theory, both algorithms are strategy-proof and yield the optimal result. In the experiment, RSD outperforms TTC. This can be attributed to a more dominant strategy play under RSD. Generally, subjects with extremely high and low levels of contingent reasoning play their dominant strategies. These results suggest that one optimal algorithm may outperform another one if individuals are boundedly rational.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 91%

Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms

Schmelzer

2018

jMID

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“…This evidence is in line with the previous finding that preferences over mechanisms which yield identical expected outcomes can differ systematically (Schmelzer, 2016). Further, the preference for SP-RSD is negatively related to dominant strategy play.…”

supporting

confidence: 91%

Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms

Schmelzer

2017

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract This paper compares two prominent stochastic assignment mechanisms in the laboratory: Random serial dictatorship (RSD) and top trading cycles with random endowments (TTC). In standard theory, both mechanisms are strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient for the house allocation problem without endowments. In the experiment, RSD outperforms TTC. This can be attributed to more dominant strategy play under RSD. The behavioral theory of obvious strategy-proofness can partly explain this difference in dominant strategy play. Generally, subjects with extremely high and low levels of contingent reasoning play their dominant strategies. These results suggest that one strategy-proof mechanism may outperform another one if individuals are boundedly rational. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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“…The main reason is probably that some of the mechanisms are not straightforward to understand, and the instructions for only one mechanism are already quite involved. However, there are two experimental papers (Schmelzer 2016(Schmelzer , 2018) that investigate subjects' preferences over mechanisms. Schmelzer (2016) studies DA with different tie-breaking rules for priorities.…”

Section: Preferences Over Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, there are two experimental papers (Schmelzer 2016(Schmelzer , 2018) that investigate subjects' preferences over mechanisms. Schmelzer (2016) studies DA with different tie-breaking rules for priorities. Motivated by recent policy debates, two common ways of dealing with ties due to coarse priorities are tested in the lab.…”

Section: Preferences Over Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey

Hakimov

Kübler

2020

Exp Econ

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The paper surveys the experimental literature on centralized matching markets, covering school choice and college admissions models. In the school choice model, one side of the market (schools) is not strategic, and rules (priorities) guide the acceptance decisions. The model covers applications such as school choice programs, centralized university admissions in many countries, and the centralized assignment of teachers to schools. In the college admissions model, both sides of the market are strategic. It applies to college and university admissions in countries where universities can select students, and centralized labor markets such as the assignment of doctors to hospitals. The survey discusses, among other things, the comparison of various centralized mechanisms, the optimality of participants' strategies, learning by applicants and their behavioral biases, as well as the role of communication, information, and advice. The main experimental findings considered in the survey concern truth-telling and strategic manipulations by the agents, as well as the stability and efficiency of the matching outcome.

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Single Versus Multiple Randomization in Matching Mechanisms

Cited by 5 publications

References 31 publications

Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms

Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms

Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms

Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey

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