SIP security issues: the SIP authentication procedure and its processing load

Salsano, Stefano; Veltri, Luca; Papalilo, D.

doi:10.1109/mnet.2002.1081764

Cited by 153 publications

(58 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…A conclusion similar to Salsano et al [196] is reached by Bilien [202] and Bilien et al [203], [204], who study the overhead in SIP call setup latency when using end-to-end and hop-by-hop security mechanisms. They consider protocols such as MIKEY, S/MIME, SRTP, TLS, and IPsec, concluding that the overall penalty of using full-strength cryptography is low.…”

Section: ) Performance Analysis (14 Items)supporting

confidence: 64%

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A Comprehensive Survey of Voice over IP Security Research

Keromytis

2012

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

116

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Abstract-We present a comprehensive survey of Voice over IP security academic research, using a set of 245 publications forming a closed cross-citation set. We classify these papers according to an extended version of the VoIP Security Alliance (VoIPSA) Threat Taxonomy. Our goal is to provide a roadmap for researchers seeking to understand existing capabilities and to identify gaps in addressing the numerous threats and vulnerabilities present in VoIP systems. We discuss the implications of our findings with respect to vulnerabilities reported in a variety of VoIP products.We identify two specific problem areas (denial of service, and service abuse) as requiring significant more attention from the research community. We also find that the overwhelming majority of the surveyed work takes a black box view of VoIP systems that avoids examining their internal structure and implementation. Such an approach may miss the mark in terms of addressing the main sources of vulnerabilities, i.e., implementation bugs and misconfigurations. Finally, we argue for further work on understanding cross-protocol and cross-mechanism vulnerabilities (emergent properties), which are the byproduct of a highly complex system-of-systems and an indication of the issues in future large-scale systems.

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Section: ) Performance Analysis (14 Items)supporting

confidence: 64%

“…Salsano et al [196] give an overview of the various SIP security mechanisms (as of 2002), focusing particularly on the authentication component. They conduct an evaluation of the processing costs of SIP calls that involve authentication, under different transport, authentication and encryption scenarios.…”

Section: ) Performance Analysis (14 Items)mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comprehensive Survey of Voice over IP Security Research

Keromytis

2012

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

116

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“…The first participant is 74995799173 which uses an application called OSMO installed on a Sony SGP771 28.0.A. First the authentication [6] for 74995799173 takes place and the Façade server check with the UC server the account for this specific subscriber: When UC server finds out that the preferred device for this 74995799172 participant is 749957991721 configured on a computer, it forwards the SIP invite to this device. From this point all the signaling messages follow this path: participant 1 device ßàSBC ßàPBAXßàSBCßà participant 2 device.…”

Section: Fig 3 Mvoip Call Flowmentioning

confidence: 99%

METHODS OF INTEGRATING mVoIP IN ADDITION TO A VoIP ENVIRONMENT

MOZA¹,

Alexandru²

2016

Review of the Air Force Academy

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“…Salsano et al [21] evaluated the SIP processing overhead when SIP authentication and TLS are employed. Bellovin et al analyzed the challenges in applying the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) to wiretap VoIP calls [14].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the feasibility of launching the man-in-the-middle attacks on VoIP from remote attackers

Zhang

Wang

Farley

et al. 2009

Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security

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The man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack has been shown to be one of the most serious threats to the security and trust of existing VoIP protocols and systems. For example, the MITM who is in the VoIP signaling and/or media path can easily wiretap, divert and even hijack selected VoIP calls by tempering with the VoIP signaling and/or media traffic. Since all previously identified MITM attacks on VoIP require the adversary initially in the VoIP signaling and/or media path, there is a common belief that it is infeasible for a remote attacker, who is not initially in the VoIP path, to launch any MITM attack on VoIP. This makes people think that securing all the nodes along the normal path of VoIP traffic is sufficient to prevent MITM attacks on VoIP.In this paper, we demonstrate that a remote attacker who is not initially in the path of VoIP traffic can indeed launch all kinds of MITM attacks on VoIP by exploiting DNS and VoIP implementation vulnerabilities. Our case study of Vonage VoIP, the No.1 residential VoIP service in the U.S. market, shows that a remote attacker from anywhere on the Internet can stealthily become a remote MITM through DNS spoofing attack on a Vonage phone, as long as the remote attacker knows the phone number and the IP address of the Vonage phone. We further show that the remote attacker can effectively wiretap and hijack targeted Vonage VoIP calls after becoming the remote MITM. Our results demonstrate that (1) the MITM attack on VoIP is much more realistic than previously thought; (2) securing all nodes along the path of VoIP traffic is not adequate to prevent MITM attack on VoIP; (3) vulnerabilities of non-VoIP-specific protocols (e.g., DNS) can indeed lead to compromise of VoIP.

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SIP security issues: the SIP authentication procedure and its processing load

Cited by 153 publications

References 10 publications

A Comprehensive Survey of Voice over IP Security Research

A Comprehensive Survey of Voice over IP Security Research

METHODS OF INTEGRATING mVoIP IN ADDITION TO A VoIP ENVIRONMENT

On the feasibility of launching the man-in-the-middle attacks on VoIP from remote attackers

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