Situation awareness as a determinant for unsafe actions and subjective risk assessment on offshore attendant vessels

Abstract

Situation awareness (SA) is often argued to be a "sharp end" indicator of workplace safety, in the sense that inaccurate SA may be the proximal cause for operator error. However, traditional field or lab experiment measures of SA are difficult to combine with large-scale data collections to examine organizational influences on SA and the safety outcomes of SA. In the current study, offshore attendant vessel crew's SA was measured with a self-report scale. Authentic leadership was modelled as a predictor, while self-report of committing unsafe actions at work and subjective risk assessment were modelled as outcome measures. Structural equation modelling showed the captain's leadership style to account for variation in SA and some variation in unsafe actions. Further, SA accounted for variation in unsafe actions and in subjective risk assessment. The study supports the assumption that SA has a crucial role in maritime safety.

Assessment of the chemical hazard awareness of petrol tanker driver: A case study

“…This could impair the capability to notify the spillage especially from smell due to high frequency of occurrence in addition contributing to higher exposure to petrol (Doty, 2015). The decrease of sensitivity and responsivity of an employee due to the impairment of sense such as smell could lead to inaccurate in situation awareness of their working conditions making them vulnerable to various type of hazard and possible working errors (Sætrevik and Hystad, 2017).…”

“…Tanker driver may be unable to identify the spillage due to the impairment of the sense such as smell due to constant contact with petrol (Menzel et al., 2019). The sensitivity and the responsivity of a person to identify the changes in the working environment varies and largely related to the different exposure history of a person stated in the frequency analysis (Doty, 2015; Sætrevik and Hystad, 2017). On the other hand, the drivers may have different opinion on spillage or leakage based on their risk perception and situation awareness where they only considered large quantity of petrol loss as spillage whereas a small quantity of petrol leaks as normal condition of their work because of the frequency of small spillage may occurred to frequently as shown in the frequency analysis of question 6 Table 3 (Renner et al., 2015; Sætrevik and Hystad, 2017).…”

Decreased Job Security Without Change in Safety During Hydrocarbon Industry Recession

“…Given the authority the captains possess, they may be instrumental in directing the worker's attention to safety issues (see e.g. Saetrevik & Hystad, 2017;. This is among the first studies to investigate the impact of recession on hydrocarbon maritime workers' perceptions of safety and job security.…”

Can Survey Measures Predict Subsequent Key Performance Indicators of Maritime Safety? Confirmatory and Exploratory Analyses of the Association between Self - report and Objective Indices

“…It would thus be resource extensive and unrealistic to measure the SA of all crew members across all their tasks. Previous studies have developed and supported an approach measuring the selfreported experience of SA across work settings (Hjellvik et al, 2019;Saetrevik, 2013;Saetrevik & Hystad, 2017, 2019. Measuring the crew's SA, as well as other safety factors "in the field" aboard CTVs provides information about the safety level aboard the vessels and the anticipated products of the crew's self-reported cognitive states and performance.…”

“…Self-report of safe or unsafe behaviour is often used as a proxy for actual behaviour (e.g. Hjellvik et al, 2019;Naevestad et al, 2019;Sneddon, Mearns, & Flin, 2013;Saetrevik & Hystad, 2017, 2019. The current study used self-report to measure the personal and collective safety responsibilities of the crew working on CTVs.…”