Situativity and Symbols: Response to Vera and Simon

Abstract

Vera and Simon (1993) haye provided a helpful and welcome challenge in their articulate questioning of the point of view that emphasizes the situated character of action, including cognition and learning. A full discussion of their arguments and examples requires more space than we are allotted for this response, and we are preparing a longer article that will consider the issues they raised in more detail. We also welcome this opportunity to comment briefly on their provocative arguments. The Issue of SymbolsVera and Simon attribute several beliefs to researchers who are developing situativity theory, some of which we disclaim for ourselves and consider dubious regarding other situativity theorists. However, we do accept their characterization that our view "denies that symbolic processing lies at the heart of intelligence" (pp. 7-8). As we understand the current state of the debate, the issue hinges crucially on the meaning and theoretical status of the concept of symbol.In our view, the emerging scientific practices, empirical findings, and theory that we call situativity theory include the development of ecological psychology (e

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“…For a theory in which perception, action, and cognition are not clearly distinguishable, 'situativity' (coined by Greeno & Moore, 1993) is considered to be a more appropriate label than 'action' or 'cognition'. The term 'development' encompasses both the global structural changes during childhood as well as the specific learning processes.…”

Topologies of learning and development

“…All that is required here is a functional account, not an epistemic account. Not all phenomena involved in perception and action need be or can be representational (Greeno & Moore, 1993).…”

“…The streams of Ss and Rs in behaviorism, and the explicit programs and data in information-processing models, must be transcended (Greeno & Moore, 1993). Just as trivial interactive knowing and learning processes can manifest unbounded potential S-R capacities, so can trivial microgenetic processes manifest unbounded potential programs.…”

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