Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement

Abstract

This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa’s trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation.

The Methodologically Flawed Discussion about Deep Disagreement

“…Here, different forms of rational resolvability and irresolvability will have to be to distinguished since rational irresolvability is a multiply ambiguous notion. As Ranalli notes (2021: 985): "We might have in mind that (i) there's no epistemically rational way to resolve the disagreement; or that (ii) there's no practically rational way 18 For classifications of different forms of deep disagreement, see Melchior (2023a) and Simard Smith and Lynch (2021). to resolve the disagreement; or further still that (iii) the disagreement isn't resolvable by way of argumentation and the exchange of reasons (e.g., paradigmatic rational methods or ways of resolving disagreements.)"…”

“…Moreover, I think that they naturally lead to the view, sketched here, that deep disagreement is a form of rationally irresolvable disagreement. On the connection between deep disagreement and skeptical problems, see Melchior (2023a).…”

Implicaciones Metafilosóficas De Los Desacuerdos Filosóficos Profundos

“…3 Melchior (2021) apunta que los desacuerdos profundos pueden interpretarse como una instancia de argumentación incapaz de persuadir racionalmente. De este modo, el problema no es epistémico porque es posible creer justificadamente en nuestros criterios de evidencia sin que sea posible persuadir a un oponente que utiliza criterios de evidencia contrarios.…”