Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning

Abstract

Empirical work on motivated reasoning suggests that our judgments are influenced to a surprising extent by our wants, desires, and preferences (Kahan 2016; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Molden and Higgins 2012; Taber and Lodge 2006). How should we evaluate the epistemic status of beliefs formed through motivated reasoning? For example, are such beliefs epistemically justified? Are they candidates for knowledge? In liberal democracies, these questions are increasingly controversial as well as politically timely (Beebe et al. 2018; Lynch Forthcoming, 2018; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010). And yet, the epistemological significance of motivated reasoning has been almost entirely ignored by those working in mainstream epistemology. We aim to rectify this oversight. Using politically motivated reasoning as a case study, we show how motivated reasoning gives rise to three distinct kinds of skeptical challenges. We conclude by showing how the skeptical import of motivated reasoning has some important ramifications for how we should think about the demands of intellectual humility.

An argument for egalitarian confirmation bias and against political diversity in academia

“…(Richard Buckminster Fuller) 1 Many studies have shown that people frequently engage in politically motivated cognition: we often tend to conform our assessments and beliefs about information to our political goals and political identity rather than to accuracy (Kunda 1990;Taber and Lodge 2006;Nisbet et al 2015;Kahan 2016). Politically motivated cognition, which is taken to be less than fully epistemically rational because it involves a diminished sensitivity to facts (Huemer 2016;Ringel et al 2019), has recently become a hot topic in philosophy (Gerken 2019;Peters 2019;Talisse 2019;Carter and McKenna 2020). The present paper offers a social epistemological investigation of a specific type of politically motivated cognition.…”

Motivated reasoning and the ethics of belief

“…14 What is the epistemic status of a person's belief that is not the result of motivated reasoning but that the person does not have strong reason to think is not the result of motivated reasoning? (Carter & McKenna, 2020). Is motivated reasoning something that one who aspires for epistemic excellence should try to preempt?…”

“…If I come to believe that human cognition in general is much more impacted by motivated reasoning than I had realized, would it be irresponsible not to reduce the confidence of my beliefs in general, or of particular domains of belief, such as political beliefs? 14 What is the epistemic status of a person's belief that is not the result of motivated reasoning but that the person does not have strong reason to think is not the result of motivated reasoning? (Carter & McKenna, 2020). Is motivated reasoning something that one who aspires for epistemic excellence should try to preempt?…”

“…In fact, Siegel's use of the expression “wishful thinking” is unusual). Avnur and Scott‐Kakures (2015), and Carter and McKenna (2020), are also notable exceptions. A central goal of each is to elucidate and support the initial thought that motivated reasoning, or the beliefs formed through it, are epistemically unjustified.…”

‘Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism I & II’

“…31 31 See also Carter and McKenna (2020) for a discussion of politically motivated reasoning. Although they sketch the possible skeptical implications of such reasoning, they refrain from evaluating the plausibility of such implications. …”