2012
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.6582
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Skyrms. 2010. Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information

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“…Thus, the player would systematically send deceptive signals, such as incomplete information or misinformation, to the other party. Although [44] praised this point as a logical counter-example against the Kantian notion, this argument is by no means new. First, many ethicists agree that in extraordinary situations it is imperative for us to lie.…”
Section: Analysis Of Naturalness Stabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, the player would systematically send deceptive signals, such as incomplete information or misinformation, to the other party. Although [44] praised this point as a logical counter-example against the Kantian notion, this argument is by no means new. First, many ethicists agree that in extraordinary situations it is imperative for us to lie.…”
Section: Analysis Of Naturalness Stabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%