Slavery, Federalism, and the Structure of the Constitution

Maltz, Earl M.

doi:10.2307/845555

Cited by 6 publications

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“…Scholars typically describe the debate over slavery at the Convention as a conflict between "anti-slavery representatives" and "slave state representatives" (Maltz 1992). Most of their focus has been on philosophical or legal principles produced by the document (Allen 1988;Freehling 1972;Ohline 1971) and on carefully describing the debate along with the state interests on each vote (DuBois [1896(DuBois [ ] 1969Robinson 1971;Kaminski 1995;Rakove 1996;Finkelman 2001).…”

Section: Motivation Of the Framersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting on slavery at the Constitutional Convention

Dougherty

Heckelman

2008

Public Choice

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This paper provides the first empirical study of delegate voting behavior on issues of slavery at the U.S. Constitutional Convention. We analyze two categories of votes: those related to apportionment and those related to the regulation of the slave trade. Although it is widely believed that delegates voted consistent with the interests of their states on issues of slavery, we find that for votes on apportionment, the effect of state interests was enhanced by both the delegate's personal interest and his religious background. For votes regulating the slave trade, state interests had a significant effect but only within specific regions.

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Section: Motivation Of the Framersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voting on slavery at the Constitutional Convention

Dougherty

Heckelman

2008

Public Choice

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Democracy and Legal Change

Schwartzberg

2007

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Since ancient Athens, democrats have taken pride in their power and inclination to change their laws, yet they have also sought to counter this capacity by creating immutable laws. In Democracy and Legal Change, Melissa Schwartzberg argues that modifying law is a fundamental and attractive democratic activity. Against those who would defend the use of 'entrenchment clauses' to protect key constitutional provisions from revision, Schwartzberg seeks to demonstrate historically the strategic and even unjust purposes unamendable laws have typically served, and to highlight the regrettable consequences that entrenchment may have for democracies today. Drawing on historical evidence, classical political theory, and contemporary constitutional and democratic theory, Democracy and Legal Change reexamines the relationship between democracy and the rule of law from a new, and often surprising, set of vantage points.

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The Antislavery Judge Reconsidered

Schmitt¹

2011

Law hist. rev.

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It is conventionally believed that neutral legal principles required antislavery judges to uphold proslavery legislation in spite of their moral convictions against slavery. Under this view, an antislavery judge who ruled on proslavery legislation was forced to choose, not between liberty and slavery, but rather between liberty and fidelity to his conception of the judicial role in a system of limited government. Focusing on the proslavery Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, this article challenges the conventional view by arguing that the constitutionality of the fugitive act was ambiguous; meaning that neutral legal principles supported a ruling against the fugitive act as well as a ruling in favor of it, and that prominent antislavery judges were influenced to uphold the act by a belief that doing so was necessary in order to preserve the Union.

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Slavery, Federalism, and the Structure of the Constitution

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Voting on slavery at the Constitutional Convention

Voting on slavery at the Constitutional Convention

Democracy and Legal Change

The Antislavery Judge Reconsidered

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