Over the past decades, mood enhancement effects of various drugs and neuromodulation technologies have been proclaimed. If one day highly effective methods for significantly altering and elevating one's mood are available, it is conceivable that the demand for them will be considerable. One urgent concern will then be what role physicians should play in providing such services. The concern can be extended from literature on controversial demands for aesthetic surgery. According to Margaret Little, physicians should be aware that certain aesthetic enhancement requests reflect immoral social norms and ideals. By granting such requests, she argues, doctors render themselves complicit to a collective 'evil'. In this paper, we wish to question the extent to which physicians, psychiatrists and/or neurosurgeons should play a role as 'moral gatekeepers' in dealing with suspect demands and norms underlying potential desires to alter one's mood or character. We investigate and discuss the nature and limits of physician responsibilities in reference to various hypothetical and intuitively problematic mood enhancement requests.
Aims and ScopeOver the past decades, insight in the neurochemical basis of our cognition and emotion has increased significantly. This has driven the production of new drugs which outstrip former generations of psychotropic medication in terms of ability to modulate brain functions with greater precision. Expected progress in this area makes such drugs an attractive option for non-patients who do not suffer from a particular disorder, but who wish to elevate their baseline cognitive and affective functions without having to bear the side-effects related to most recreational drugs. Indeed, we have already witnessed soaring sales of methylphenidate, dextroamphetamine, modafinil and various selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) once their enhancement effects were proclaimed.It is too early to predict if the current hype over psychopharmacological and neurotechnological enhancement is realistic. Nonetheless, if neuroscience does prove to provide highly effective methods for Neuroethics (2009) 2:151-162