Sleeping With Your Friends’ Enemies: An Explanation of Sanctions-Busting Trade

Early, Bryan R.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.01523.x

Cited by 93 publications

(95 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…5 The role of sanctions buster or ''black knight'' countries that come to the aid of the target (Early, 2009), and the difficulties involved in establishing and maintaining a sanctions coalition (Drezner, 2000;Kaempfter and Lowenberg, 1999;Mansfield, 1995;Martin, 1992;Miers and Morgan, 2002), are frequent topics in the sanctions literature. Hufbauer et al (2007) maintain that one reason why sanctions may fail is that powerful or wealthy allies of the target come to its aid.…”

Section: Fdi and The Effectiveness Of Us Sanctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of foreign direct investment on the use and success of US sanctions

Lektzian

Biglaiser

2013

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Although the relationship between trade and the use and success of sanctions is frequently studied in international relations, researchers have generally failed to address the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) on sanctions despite global capital markets dwarfing the exchange of goods and services. Using panel data for 171 countries from 1971 to 2000, we test the effect of FDI on the use and success of sanctions imposed by the USA. We find evidence that a high level of economic engagement in the form of US FDI as a percentage of the recipient county's gross domestic product reduces the likelihood of the use of US sanctions. We also find that, when sanctions are imposed, declining US FDI generally has a positive and significant effect on sanctions success. However, if non-US firms offset lost US FDI, the probability of sanctions success decreases. The results show that investors may have an important influence on foreign policy outcomes.

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Section: Fdi and The Effectiveness Of Us Sanctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of foreign direct investment on the use and success of US sanctions

Lektzian

Biglaiser

2013

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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“…Sanctions busters are states that dramatically increase their trade and/or foreign assistance with target states after they have been sanctioned (Hufbauer et al 2007;Early 2009Early , 2011. Sanctions busters are states that dramatically increase their trade and/or foreign assistance with target states after they have been sanctioned (Hufbauer et al 2007;Early 2009Early , 2011.…”

Section: Economic Sanctions Spoiler Behaviors and International Insmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Early (2009Early ( , 2012 has shown that most of the sanctions-busting trade conducted by third-party states is driven by commercially motivated firms and traders. Commercial motivations are at the heart of what drives most private actors to engage in sanctions-busting trade, whereas government interests in sanctionsbusting are shaped by both the commercial and political benefits it can provide.…”

Section: Economic Sanctions Spoiler Behaviors and International Insmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Commercial motivations are at the heart of what drives most private actors to engage in sanctions-busting trade, whereas government interests in sanctionsbusting are shaped by both the commercial and political benefits it can provide. This suggests that firms with an interest in sanctions-busting will tend to concentrate in third-party venues that offer them the most profitable, reliable means of exploiting the trade opportunities vis-a-vis a particular target state (Early 2009). This means that the more profitable the trade opportunities with target states are, the more likely third-party sanctions busters will emerge to exploit those trade opportunities (also, see Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999;Drezner 2000).…”

Section: Economic Sanctions Spoiler Behaviors and International Insmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Drawing on the liberal-based explanation of sanctions-busting trade, we include a series of variables to account for the commercial ties and profiles of the third-party and target states (Early 2009(Early , 2012. Drawing on the liberal-based explanation of sanctions-busting trade, we include a series of variables to account for the commercial ties and profiles of the third-party and target states (Early 2009(Early , 2012.…”

Section: Control Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Economic Sanctions, International Institutions, and Sanctions Busters: When Does Institutionalized Cooperation Help Sanctioning Efforts?

Early

Spice

2014

Foreign Policy Anal

Self Cite

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When international institutions obligate their members to impose economic sanctions against a target state, how much do those sanctions obligations actually impact their members' behavior? To date, the consensus view has treated all international institutions as if they are equally capable of making multilateral sanctioning efforts more effective. Building upon the enforcement theory of sanctions cooperation, we instead theorize that the ability of international institutions to constrain their members from engaging in spoiler behaviors degrades the larger they are. We hypothesize that sanctions obligations imposed by smaller‐sized institutions are more effective at preventing their members from becoming extensive trade‐based sanctions busters than those imposed by larger ones. We test our hypothesis via a quantitative analysis of how the involvement of five different international institutions in sanctioning efforts influenced their members' likelihoods of sanctions‐busting. We find that only the smaller‐sized institutions we examine appear capable of constraining their members from undercutting sanctioning efforts. Notably, we find no evidence that the United Nations' sanctions actually prevent its members from sanctions‐busting.

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Do Sanctions Cause Economic Growth Collapses?

Splinter

Klomp

2021

Nl Arms

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This chapter explores whether economic sanctions are able to trigger sudden economic growth collapses. The primarily aim of economic sanctions is to cause a political or behavioural change by imposing serious restrictions on important economic activities undertaken by the target country. In particular, the basic idea is that sanctions cause a large adverse and sudden shock to the target’s economy. It assumes that when this shock is severe enough, the target country is more willing to cooperate. The findings reported in this chapter clearly demonstrate that economic sanctions have a significant positive effect on the likelihood of a growth deceleration in the first three years after the first threat signals or actual imposition. It turns out that not all sanctions are equally successful in creating a sudden economic shock. In particular, trade sanctions, multilateral sanctions, and sanctions aimed at the business sector are the most harmful for the economy of the target country.

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Sleeping With Your Friends’ Enemies: An Explanation of Sanctions-Busting Trade

Cited by 93 publications

References 35 publications

The effect of foreign direct investment on the use and success of US sanctions

The effect of foreign direct investment on the use and success of US sanctions

Economic Sanctions, International Institutions, and Sanctions Busters: When Does Institutionalized Cooperation Help Sanctioning Efforts?

Do Sanctions Cause Economic Growth Collapses?

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