Slots in Universals

Gilmore, Cody

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682904.003.0005

Cited by 11 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Were this so, mereological nominalists can say likewise. Alternatively, they might say relatedness is inexplicable and that adicity facts are brute facts [Gilmore : 191‐200]. Again, mereological nominalists can simply say it's a brute fact that some fusions are n ‐adic.…”

Section: Compared To Vanilla Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Option four is to introduce abstract ‘slots’ which are constituents of universals: To be n ‐adic is to have n slots [Gilmore ]. The mereological nominalist might say the same, accepting that slots exist and that they're constituents of fusions.…”

Section: Compared To Vanilla Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… Gilmore [: 199‐200] complains that this doesn't help with relations which can have identical relata (e.g. Identity and Being At Least As Tall As ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Mereological Nominalism

Effingham

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Compared To Vanilla Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Compared To Vanilla Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Mereological Nominalism

Effingham

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…One is free, for example, to say that loving is 2‐adic but has no argument places. (Though see Gilmore (2013) for critical discussion of various ‘slot‐free’ treatments of adicity. )…”

Section: Objections and Repliesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We assume that (i) if an open sentence contains exactly n free variables and expresses a relation of some fixed adicity, it expresses an n‐adic relation and that (ii) necessarily, no relation is both m‐ and n‐adic, where m ≠ n This leaves open the hypothesis that some relations have no fixed adicity. On the incompatibility of different adicities, see Gilmore (2013).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Speaks’s Reduction of Propositions to Properties: A Benacerraf Problem

Dixon

Gilmore

2016

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Speaks (2014) defends the view that propositions are properties: for example, the proposition that grass is green is the property being such that grass is green. We argue that there is no reason to prefer Speaks's theory to analogous but competing theories that identify propositions with, say, 2‐adic relations. This style of argument has recently been deployed by many, including Moore (1999) and King (2007), against the view that propositions are n‐tuples, and by Caplan and Tillman (2013) against King's view that propositions are facts of a special sort. We offer our argument as an objection to the view that propositions are unsaturated (non‐0‐adic) relations.

show abstract

How to be a postmodal directionalist

Dixon

2024

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to directionalism, non-symmetric relations are distinct from their converses. Kit Fine (2000a) argues that the directionalist faces a dilemma; they must either (i) reject the principle Uniqueness, which states that no completion (fact, state of affairs, or proposition) is a completion of more than one relation, or (ii) reject the principle Identity, which states that each completion of a relation is identical to a completion of its converse (e.g., Dante’s loving Bice is identical to Bice’s being loved by Dante). Fine’s argument has been regarded as a decisive blow to directionalism. But new strategies for replying to it can be developed with the tools of the postmodal metaphysician, who is comfortable individuating relations and their completions hyperintensionally, allowing for necessary connections between distinct entities, and making use of hyperintensional notions like essence and grounding. In what follows, I develop postmodal strategies for denying both horns of Fine’s dilemma, concluding that the postmodal directionalist need not be concerned with Fine’s argument.

show abstract

Slots in Universals

Cited by 11 publications

References 22 publications

Mereological Nominalism

Mereological Nominalism

Speaks’s Reduction of Propositions to Properties: A Benacerraf Problem

How to be a postmodal directionalist

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About