2011
DOI: 10.3166/ejc.17.547-567
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Smart Grid: Overview, Issues and Opportunities. Advances and Challenges in Sensing, Modeling, Simulation, Optimization and Control

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Cited by 114 publications
(35 citation statements)
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“…A considerable body of work exists on broad aspects of cyber‐physical security tackling different dimensions, 43,44,45,46,8,6 as well as a survey of surveys about these issues 47 . Research gaps highlighted in these surveys include: (1) modeling incident responses and impact in co‐simulation frameworks; (2) easy to read and interchangeable format for representing security incidents; (3) simulation of cascading attacks (or chain failures) and their effects on the infrastructure; (4) data obtained from security based testbeds (used as parameters to models) from real‐world architectures addressing attacks or instabilities; (5) studying the system‐wide effects of incidents over wide‐areas impacting energy GT&D as well as telecommunication networks; and (6) corrupted data transmission across the ICT infrastructure (from different sources with replay or data injection attacks) and impacts on system‐level decisions to balance energy supply and demand.…”
Section: Power Grids and Co‐simulationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A considerable body of work exists on broad aspects of cyber‐physical security tackling different dimensions, 43,44,45,46,8,6 as well as a survey of surveys about these issues 47 . Research gaps highlighted in these surveys include: (1) modeling incident responses and impact in co‐simulation frameworks; (2) easy to read and interchangeable format for representing security incidents; (3) simulation of cascading attacks (or chain failures) and their effects on the infrastructure; (4) data obtained from security based testbeds (used as parameters to models) from real‐world architectures addressing attacks or instabilities; (5) studying the system‐wide effects of incidents over wide‐areas impacting energy GT&D as well as telecommunication networks; and (6) corrupted data transmission across the ICT infrastructure (from different sources with replay or data injection attacks) and impacts on system‐level decisions to balance energy supply and demand.…”
Section: Power Grids and Co‐simulationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At present, some methods have been proposed for the frequency control of power systems [12][13][14][15][16]. As a high-dimensional nonlinear complex large-scale system, the control strategy design of modern power grids (the control output of ADES controllers) involves large-scale analytical modeling [17][18][19]. Data-driven methods are often used to solve the analytical modeling issues [20,21].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Generally, microgrids are not opposite but complementary to the interconnected power system. They can be as efficient and self-sufficient as possible, and they can island rapidly during emergencies [1]. However, when operating in islanded mode, they become weak grids and are thus less stable and more vulnerable to variable sources and loads.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%