SmartPrivacy for the Smart Grid: embedding privacy into the design of electricity conservation

Abstract

The 2003 blackout in the northern and eastern U.S. and Canada which caused a $6 billion loss in economic revenue is one of many indicators that the current electrical grid is outdated. Not only must the grid become more reliable, it must also become more efficient, reduce its impact on the environment, incorporate alternative energy sources, allow for more consumer choices, and ensure cyber security. In effect, it must become "smart." Significant investments in the billions of dollars are being made to lay the infrastructure of the future Smart Grid. However, the authors argue that we must take great care not to sacrifice consumer privacy amidst an atmosphere of unbridled enthusiasm for electricity reform. Information proliferation, lax controls and insufficient oversight of this information could lead to unprecedented invasions of consumer privacy. Smart meters and smart appliances will constitute a data explosion of intimate details of daily life, and it is not yet clear who will have access to this information beyond a person's utility provider. The authors of this paper urge the adoption of Dr. Ann Cavoukian's conceptual model 'SmartPrivacy' to prevent potential invasions of privacy while ensuring full functionality of the Smart Grid. SmartPrivacy represents a broad arsenal of protections, encapsulating everything necessary to ensure that all of the personal information held by an organization is appropriately managed. These include: Privacy by Design; law, regulation and independent oversight; accountability and transparency; market forces, education and awareness; audit and control; data security; and fair information practices. Each of these elements is important, but the concept of Privacy by Design represents its sine qua non. When applying SmartPrivacy to the Smart Grid, not only will the grid be able to, for example, become increasingly resistant to attack and natural disasters-it will be able to do so while also becoming increasingly resistant to data leakage and breaches of personal information. The authors conclude that SmartPrivacy must be built into the Smart Grid during its current nascent stage, allowing IDIS (2010) 3:275-294

Technical and governance considerations for advanced metering infrastructure/smart meters: Technology, security, uncertainty, costs, benefits, and risks

“…The potential applications and benefits of AMI integration into electricity networks are potentially numerous and substantial: interval measurement of electricity consumption; remote reading and switching capabilities; automatic meter data processing and transfer; increased electricity retail competition; a diversity of new energy service providers; increased generation, transmission, and distribution efficiency; two-way communication for increased customer information and enablement; real-time decision-making and control for both consumers and utilities (fault management, network reconfiguration, forecasting, modelling and planning); enabling of third-party assessment of network operator cost statements; etc. (Cavoukian et al, 2010;Deconinck, 2010). Yet, the potential hazards of AMI are also abundant and significant: privacy and security concerns; digital-averse consumer backlash; information and communication technologies (ICT) dependent systems, unknown technology implementation needs; high capital costs, unknown operating costs, unknown utility and advanced capability uptake; unknown technical reliability; communication technology uncertainty; potentially major competitive market changes; etc.…”

“…Standards that assist interoperability, open protocols, technology neutrality, security, and ensure future usability of AMI investments can reduce technical uncertainty, transaction costs, and provide a level of security to consumers (Cavoukian et al, 2010; Executive Office of the President, 2011). The major risk with any HAN communications protocol, node data (usually the point of delivery where the meter is), and data correction/detection, (etc.)…”

“…Therefore, security and reliability of the AMI data and networks will likely become the top priority in the development of AMI policy frameworks (Executive Office of the President, 2011; Gogn and Wheelock, 2010;Metke and Ekl, 2010). Personal information protection and security of the grid from hacking is an area that requires much attention from authorities and also significant consumer education (Cavoukian et al, 2010; Executive Office of the President, 2011; Markel et al, 2009;Metke and Ekl, 2010; U.S. Department of Energy, 2010). Electricity consumer opt-in arrangements to data sharing at time of installation may be one way where such concerns are managed (U.S. Department of Energy, 2010).…”

“…Consumer data will likely be valuable to a number of entities such as third-party marketeers, law enforcement agencies, insurance companies, researchers, and criminals. As the smart meter information is likely to be both personal and valuable, consumers (and consumer representatives) are likely to require consumers to have ownership and control over access to their own data (Cavoukian et al, 2010; U.S. Department of Energy, 2010). Therefore, consumers will require enablement to understand how to timely access to their own data and control how it is accessed and used (Executive Office of the President, 2011).…”

“…Privacy laws that stipulate what information belongs to customers and what must be protected by utilities should be in place prior to roll-out, particularly in relation to personally identifiable information (U.S. Department of Energy, 2010). Broad consultation outside of the electricity industry in relation to consumer privacy can achieve greater consistency of AMI-associated privacy standards development and other comparable sectoral requirements (Cavoukian et al, 2010; Executive Office of the President, 2011; Metke and Ekl, 2010).…”