So<i>that's</i>why I don't remember: Normalising forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

Scoboria, Alan; Lynn, Steven Jay; Hessen, Joanna K.; Fisico, Stephanie

doi:10.1080/09658210701685266

Cited by 33 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Some included ‘memory’ scales as well as ‘belief’ scales at pre‐test and post‐test (Table 1): Of these, two datasets indicated a significant increase with false feedback (Scoboria et al, 2012; Sharman & Calacouris, 2010) and two did not (Scoboria, Lynn, Hessen, & Fisico, 2007, Studies 1 and 2).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the false feedback research has also involved memory for events prior to age 3 years (Mazzoni & Loftus, 1998; Mazzoni et al, 1999), memory for interactions at Disneyland (Berkowitz et al, 2008) and memory for bone screening (Scoboria et al, 2007). Thus, although for many of the studies, it is difficult to rule out some contribution from actual experience, the range of events studied makes this implausible as an explanation for all the effects obtained.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Creating Memories for False Autobiographical Events in Childhood: A Systematic Review

Brewin

Andrews

2016

Applied Cognitive Psychology

110

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SummaryUsing a framework that distinguishes autobiographical belief, recollective experience, and confidence in memory, we review three major paradigms used to suggest false childhood events to adults: imagination inflation, false feedback and memory implantation. Imagination inflation and false feedback studies increase the belief that a suggested event occurred by a small amount such that events are still thought unlikely to have happened. In memory implantation studies, some recollective experience for the suggested events is induced on average in 47% of participants, but only in 15% are these experiences likely to be rated as full memories. We conclude that susceptibility to false memories of childhood events appears more limited than has been suggested. The data emphasise the complex judgements involved in distinguishing real from imaginary recollections and caution against accepting investigator‐based ratings as necessarily corresponding to participants' self‐reports. Recommendations are made for presenting the results of these studies in courtroom settings. © 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Creating Memories for False Autobiographical Events in Childhood: A Systematic Review

Brewin

Andrews

2016

Applied Cognitive Psychology

110

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…in assertiveness). Also noteworthy is the fact that in a recent study by Scoboria and coworkers (Scoboria, Lynn, Hessen, & Fisico, 2008), ratings of plausibility and autobiographical belief, but not memory, were affected by having been provided with a rationale normalising the forgetting (i.e. reasons why they did not remember) of certain childhood events.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What's behind crashing memories? Plausibility, belief and memory in reports of having seen non‐existent images

Smeets

Telgen

Ost

et al. 2009

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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The present study investigated the precise nature of crashing memory reports: Are they truly memories or are they based on beliefs? We asked 88 individuals whether they had seen non-existent footage of the Pim Fortuyn assassination and conducted thorough post-experimental interviews. Two-thirds of our participants falsely reported having seen the footage, while less than 10% also reported details that they could not have seen. Moreover, plausibility ratings of having seen the images were higher than false belief ratings, which in turn were higher than false memory ratings. After having been fully debriefed, 81% of the participants who reported crashing memories attributed their false report to their lack of a full understanding of the critical question. Another 10% of this subsample stated that they truly remembered the images (i.e. false memories). Thus, only a small subset of crashing memory reports seems to be induced by false beliefs and/or false memories.

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“…Studies show that false beliefs can be induced without associated increases in recollection (Bernstein, Pernat, & Loftus, 2011;Hart & Schooler, 2006;Mazzoni, Loftus, Seitz, & Lynn, 1999;Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, & Gabbay, 2006;Scoboria, Lynn, Hessen, & Fisico, 2007). The literature also shows that correlations between autobiographical belief and recollection tend to be moderate and that belief ratings frequently exceed recollection ratings (Scoboria et al, , 2004Sharman & Scoboria, 2009).…”

Section: Autobiographical Belief Without Recollectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of belief in occurrence within autobiographical memory.

Scoboria¹,

Jackson²,

Talarico³

et al. 2014

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Self Cite

145

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This article examines the idea that believing that events occurred in the past is a non-memorial decision that reflects underlying processes that are distinct from recollecting events. Research on autobiographical memory has often focused on events that are both believed to have occurred and remembered, thus tending to overlook the distinction between autobiographical belief and recollection. Studying event representations such as false memories, believed-not-remembered events, and non-believed memories shows the influence of non-memorial processes on evaluations of occurrence. Believing that an event occurred and recollecting an event may be more strongly dissociated than previously stated. The relative independence of these constructs was examined in 2 studies. In Study 1, multiple events were cued, and then each was rated on autobiographical belief, recollection, and other memory characteristics. In Study 2, participants described a nonbelieved memory, a believed memory, and a believed-not-remembered event, and they made similar ratings. In both studies, structural equation modeling techniques revealed distinct belief and recollection latent variables. Modeling the predictors of these factors revealed a double dissociation: Perceptual, re-experiencing, and emotional features predicted recollection and not belief, whereas event plausibility strongly predicted belief and weakly predicted recollection. The results show that judgments of autobiographical belief and recollection are distinct, that each is influenced by different sources of information and processes, and that the strength of their relationship varies depending on the type of event under study. The concept of autobiographical belief is elaborated, and implications of the findings are discussed in relation to decision making about events, social influence on memory, metacognition, and recognition processes.

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Sothat'swhy I don't remember: Normalising forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

Cited by 33 publications

References 32 publications

Creating Memories for False Autobiographical Events in Childhood: A Systematic Review

Creating Memories for False Autobiographical Events in Childhood: A Systematic Review

What's behind crashing memories? Plausibility, belief and memory in reports of having seen non‐existent images

The role of belief in occurrence within autobiographical memory.

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